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INTRODUCTION 
Patents and copyrights originate from the same constitutional 
source of law,1 and for this reason they are in some respects similar. 
Patent and copyright law alike extend to inventors and authors 
exclusive rights over the fruits of their intellectual labors, enabling 
owners to extract value from intangible goods that would otherwise 
not be profitable.2 Both systems are premised on a utilitarian bargain, 
allowing inventors and authors to have socially costly monopoly 
interests in their inventions and works in order to encourage socially 
beneficial innovative and artistic production.3 And patents and 
copyrights both last only for finite periods, in contrast to the 
perpetuity of most property interests, in order to both enrich the 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating six exclusive rights of copyright owners); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(1) (2006) (enumerating exclusive rights of patent owners). 
 3. Dastar Corp. v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“The rights of 
a patentee or copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted bargain’ under which, once the 
patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and 
without attribution.”).  
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public domain and enable the creation of follow-on inventions and 
works of authorship.4 
Yet, in at least one salient respect,5 patents and copyrights are 
quite different. Patents vest only after an applicant successfully 
navigates a cumbersome examination process administered by the 
federal Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). Copyrights, by contrast, 
arise costlessly and often unintentionally, as soon as an author fixes a 
work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression.6 Patents, in 
other words, are very costly to acquire, while acquiring a copyright 
costs authors almost nothing at all. 
That patents and copyrights vest so differently raises a 
problem, and presents a puzzle. The problem—at least purportedly—is 
that each of these vesting systems generates social costs far in excess 
of its benefits. Critics of the patent system charge that the 
examination process represents a classic deadweight loss, imposing 
prohibitive costs on patentees while generating no offsetting benefits 
by screening out invalid or ineffectual patents.7 Critics of the 
copyright system charge that by extending exclusive rights to just 
about any work of authorship, society suffers from a glut of copyrights 
that deters future creation by imposing information and transaction 
costs on would-be authors.8 
In this Article, we question this conventional wisdom, arguing 
that the costliness of patents and the costlessness of copyrights have 
positive, rather than negative, effects on social welfare. The first step 
of our argument leverages emergent insights from the economic 
literature about costly screening processes. As scholars have observed 
in other settings, burdensome processes for vesting legal rights have 
social costs and benefits apart from the substantive end they are 
meant to serve. Such processes are costly screens, forcing actors who 
seek to acquire legal rights to consider whether acquisition of the right 
 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (establishing a term of seventy years after the death of the author for 
most copyrights); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (establishing patent duration of twenty years from effective 
date of filing). 
 5. Of course, patent and copyright differ in many other respects. For example, patent law 
extends to inventors broader exclusive rights than copyright law extends to authors, a point that 
we return to in detail below. See infra Parts II, III. 
 6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). 
 7. See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (critiquing the current patent vesting system). 
 8. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright 
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 613–30 (2010) (“[A]tomistic copyright causes information and 
transaction cost problems.”); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 576–79 (2005) (observing that copyright law increasingly protects smaller 
“microworks,” and that this trend is problematic). 
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will be worth the cost of doing so. Such screens cause actors to self-
select against acquisition of rights that will not generate much private 
value, and limit the vesting of those rights for reasons unrelated to the 
substantive content of the process itself. 
Bringing this insight to bear on intellectual property (“IP”) 
casts the vesting of both patents and copyrights in a new light. The 
much-maligned patent examination process functions as a classic 
costly screen. It deters applicants from seeking patents when the 
value of the exclusive right is less than the price of overcoming the 
screen. Moreover, because of a distinctive asymmetry in patent law’s 
generation of social and private value, the effect of this screen is to 
deter the production only of those low private value patents that also 
have low (or negative) social value. Examined in this light, the costly 
examination process is not a deadweight loss at all, but an efficient 
way to exclude the very kind of patents most likely to generate 
anticommons concerns. 
Process costs—or, more accurately, their absence—also help 
explain why copyright’s oft-criticized low vesting threshold generates 
social benefits in ways unappreciated by its critics. Because copyright 
law constructs authors’ property rights differently—and much more 
narrowly—than patent law constructs property rights, it produces 
very different private/social value asymmetries. If law were to impose 
a costly screen as a precondition of copyright vesting, such a screen 
would exact social costs well in excess of any benefits it produced. 
Costly copyrights would preclude the creation of only innocuous works 
of authorship, thereby failing to generate any meaningful social value. 
Process costs for copyright vesting would, however, deter the creation 
of works that have low value for their author but high value for the 
public—thus precluding production of one of the paradigmatic kinds of 
work that copyright was designed to create. 
Refracting the patent and copyright vesting systems through 
the lens of costly screen theory thus enables us to tell a very different 
story than the one currently animating most writing on this topic. 
Rather than regarding the patent examination process (and the lack of 
any process for acquiring copyrights) as social problems, we show that 
they are in fact beneficial ways to maximize social welfare from IP 
production. 
But application of costly screen theory not only reconfigures 
the conventional normative account of vesting IP rights, it also 
provides a solution to a longstanding, related puzzle. Scholars have 
often asked why law creates such different vesting thresholds for 
copyrights and patents. This question has often been addressed in the 
literature, but without a satisfactory conclusion. We argue that costly 
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screens provide a complete and parsimonious answer to this puzzle, 
and indeed that this insight allows us to craft more generally a theory 
of IP process. Our answer to this problem does not rely, as other 
accounts have, on the mere fact that copyrights and patents extend 
differential strengths of property rights to owners. Rather, we suggest 
that there is a complex interrelationship between the breadth of 
exclusive rights in information, the social/private value asymmetries 
those rights generate, and the optimal process that should govern how 
those rights vest. Indeed, we claim that this insight may be abstracted 
to the law more generally, and conclude by briefly examining related 
fields where costly screen theory can make sense of a purportedly 
suboptimal process (or the purportedly suboptimal lack of such a 
process). 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the 
essentials of costly screen analysis, providing a basis for the 
discussion that follows. Part II applies these ideas in the patent 
setting, arguing that the supposedly wasteful patent examination 
process actually enhances social welfare because it encourages 
efficient self-selection by patentees. Part III makes a similar move in 
the context of copyrights, showing by means of a counterfactual 
thought experiment that imposition of costly screens as a prerequisite 
to vesting exclusive rights in works of authorship would be 
counterproductive because it would preclude the creation of many 
highly socially valuable works. Part IV generalizes these insights in 
two ways. First, it articulates a general theory of IP process that 
illuminates a basic relationship between the statutory construction of 
exclusive rights in information and the means by which those rights 
should vest. Second, it extrapolates our argument outside the IP 
context, showing that elaborate processes (or the conspicuous lack of 
any such process) for vesting legal rights may be socially beneficial in 
ways that their critics have failed to appreciate. 
I. THE SOCIAL VALUE OF COSTLY SCREENS 
Costly screens—which we define as the price that an actor 
must pay to the government in order to take a given action—are 
ubiquitous. If you want to (legally) drive a car, you have to get a 
license from the local Department of Motor Vehicles, remit the 
requisite fees, and successfully undergo a basic competency 
evaluation. Owners who want to develop or significantly modify their 
real property must seek permits from and pay fees to the relevant 
local building authority. Similarly, operators of businesses must 
comply with federal regulations that often impose permit 
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requirements on operations likely to produce noxious effluents. Many, 
and possibly most, activities that may impose large-scale externalities 
require their agents to navigate a costly screen in one way or another.9 
These screens are often understood in terms of the content of 
the processes themselves. Licensing requirements evaluate driver skill 
to assure that the streets are not crowded with dangerously 
incompetent motorists. Permitting requirements for construction 
encourage compliance with building codes designed to ensure safety, 
while similar requirements for manufacturing encourage compliance 
with federal regulations designed to reduce pollution. Yet this 
standard account cannot explain all aspects of such screening 
processes. Requiring payment of a license or permit fee merely raises 
the costs of acquiring these rights, and does not appear to have any 
nexus with driver competence or building safety. And many screening 
processes have been shown to lack any meaningful substantive bite,10 
so that they more closely resemble a byzantine bureaucratic maze 
than a serious evaluation of an actor’s competence or safety. 
In light of the shortcomings of this standard explanation, an 
alternative account—which we refer to throughout this Article as 
costly screen theory—has emerged.11 Its exponents, increasingly 
numerous in the legal academy, have argued that cumbersome 
procedural requirements have social value not because of their 
substantive accuracy, but simply because some actors cannot afford to 
pay the price associated with these costly screens, and are thus 
precluded from acquiring the associated rights. So long as costly 
screens select against those actors whose exercise of the right at issue 
would be socially counterproductive, such screens enhance aggregate 
welfare value regardless of the substance of the process that they 
impose.12 
 
 9. There are conspicuous exceptions. People are free to have children absent any licensing 
requirement, and regardless of their parental fitness. 
 10. We discuss several of these types of processes below. See infra Part IV.B. 
 11. Scholars have applied costly screen theory in various legal settings. See, e.g., Hans 
Gersbach, The Money-Burning Refinement: With An Application to A Political Signaling Game, 
33 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 67, 72–86 (2004); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising 
Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies 
with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1160–
61 (2001); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 561 (1973); Matthew C. 
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 
(2006); Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Sorting out the Differences Between Screening and 
Signaling Models, in PAPERS IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY SEMINAR AT 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY (Michael Dempster ed., 1989).  
 12. Indeed, costly screen theory is agnostic as to the content of the screen itself. A fee in the 
amount of X on actors is functionally equivalent to a process that requires no fee but imposes 
transaction costs equivalent to X. 
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To illustrate how costly screens can affect and sometimes 
enhance the production of goods, consider an imaginary firm called 
DouglasCo.13 DouglasCo manufactures a product called Bairds, but its 
manufacturing process also generates social costs in the form of 
pollution.14 Society thus wants DouglasCo to manufacture Bairds, but 
only when their production enhances social welfare—that is, only 
when the private value of producing Bairds (i.e., the profits they 
generate for DouglasCo) exceeds the social costs of their production 
(i.e., pollution). The problem, though, is that DouglasCo cannot be 
counted on to limit its production by reference to this calculus because 
its production operates independently of any aggregate social welfare 
analysis. DouglasCo will continue to manufacture Bairds whenever 
they create private value for the firm because it does not, by 
assumption, bear the social costs of its pollution.15 
Now imagine that a government actor, Regulator, is charged 
with addressing this problem. How can Regulator limit instances in 
which DouglasCo’s production of Bairds produces a socially harmful 
amount of pollution? Regulator would love to simply ban production 
where the social costs of producing Bairds are greater than the private 
value they create, but she cannot enact this ban because the private 
value of making Bairds is a fact known only to DouglasCo. 
Costly screens may provide a solution to this difficulty. 
Regulator could simply impose on DouglasCo a price—say, a permit 
fee—in order to obtain the right to produce Bairds. If the permit fee is 
greater than the private value that DouglasCo generates by producing 
Bairds, then DouglasCo will simply cease production. Where 
DouglasCo’s manufacture of Bairds creates more pollution than it does 
private value, Regulator’s imposition of a costly screen to stymie the 
firm’s production is a welfare-maximizing outcome. 
But there is no guarantee that the costly screen will block 
DouglasCo from producing Bairds in all cases when producing Bairds 
is welfare diminishing, and no guarantee that the costly screen will 
not block DouglasCo from producing Bairds when producing Bairds is 
welfare enhancing. Regulator’s costly screen will stop DouglasCo’s 
production whenever the screen makes production of Bairds a losing 
proposition for the firm, including even those instances where 
 
 13. We would like to thank our mentor and colleague Douglas Baird for tolerating our use of 
his name in connection with this hypothetical. 
 14. We make the simplifying assumption that the only social cost exacted by DouglasCo’s 
production of Bairds is pollution. In reality, the social costs of producing any good are much more 
varied. 
 15. In more formal terms, we would say that the social costs of DouglasCo’s manufacture of 
Bairds are not internalized. 
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production creates no pollution.16 The fundamental problem is that 
DouglasCo will react based on how the costly screen compares to the 
private value of producing Bairds, while Regulator really cares about 
the social value of producing Bairds, which depends on the amount of 
pollution generated. 
Given this mismatch, is it ever possible for Regulator to impose 
costly screens in a way that is likely to enhance social welfare? We 
think the answer is yes, and in order to illustrate how, we introduce 
one more variation to this extended hypothetical. Assume that 
DouglasCo makes two kinds of Bairds, A and B. Imagine that Baird A 
earns DouglasCo significant profits and usually (but not always) 
results in relatively little pollution. In other words, making Baird A is 
always a winning proposition for DouglasCo and often (but not 
always) a winning proposition for society at large. Baird B, by 
contrast, earns DouglasCo much less by way of profit, but it invariably 
generates significant pollution. In other words, making Baird B is 
(barely) a winning proposition for DouglasCo, but it is always a losing 
proposition for society. Let’s assume further that Regulator has no 
idea beforehand whether DouglasCo is making Baird A or Baird B, 
even after the goods have hit the marketplace. (This may seem like a 
contrived set of circumstances, but we will demonstrate later that a 
great proportion of intellectual property actually does have these 
features.) 
Under these circumstances, Regulator can use costly screens to 
exploit the asymmetry between the private value that the Bairds 
create for DouglasCo and the public value that they generate for 
society at large. As we have seen, Baird A sometimes creates social 
benefits and sometimes does not, but it always generates value for 
DouglasCo. By contrast, Baird B is always harmful to society, and 
only sometimes generates value for DouglasCo.17 So, if Regulator can 
at least determine the value that Baird B creates for DouglasCo, it can 
set a costly screen priced at, or slightly above, that value. This screen 
will make it so that DouglasCo will no longer produce Baird B (since 
the screen would cost more than the profits generated by that good), 
but will not preclude production of Baird A (since the profits from 
 
 16. The story is actually a little bit more complicated because the imposition of the screen 
itself is a social cost that must be reflected in the cost-benefit analysis, so the screen is desirable 
only where the private value of making Bairds exceeds both the pollution generated by the 
manufacturing process and the cost to DouglasCo of navigating the screen. 
 17. One might wonder why DouglasCo would bother making Baird B at all, since Baird A is 
consistently more profitable for the firm. It may do so because Baird A is difficult to produce, and 
cannot be generated with any regularity. While this may seem odd, we will demonstrate that this 
too is a feature common to copyrights and patents. 
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making Baird A remain greater than the costs imposed by the screen). 
Here, then, Regulator’s costly screen is welfare enhancing because it 
blocks production of a socially costly good while continuing to allow 
production of a (frequently) socially beneficial one.18 
Consider as well this variation: What if production of Baird B, 
despite its marginal profitability for DouglasCo, sometimes led to 
massive pollution while at other times created no pollution at all? This 
small change alters the result entirely. Here, imposing a costly screen 
would still preclude DouglasCo from making highly polluting and 
therefore socially costly versions of Baird B, but it would also preclude 
the firm from making nonpolluting and therefore socially beneficial 
versions of Baird B. Under these conditions, Regulator could no longer 
conclude that imposing costly screens on DouglasCo’s production of 
Bairds would likely be welfare enhancing. If the “good” Baird Bs 
outnumbered the “bad” Baird Bs, it would be a mistake to block their 
production entirely. 
This highly abstracted example illustrates how processes 
imposed by government in advance of exercising a given right can 
generate social value that is independent of the content of the process 
itself. The extended hypothetical we have sketched out here, while 
highly abstract, describes two major areas of intellectual property 
law—patent and copyright—and lays the foundation for showing how 
the processes for vesting each of these rights are best understood as 
costly screens. We take up this argument in the sections that follow. 
II. COSTLY PATENTS 
For patent applicants, the process of patent examination is 
costly. The average patent applicant will pay more than $20,000 to 
obtain a patent, and that figure can be much higher for patents in 
complex technological fields. At the same time, examination does not 
reliably weed out the worst patents. Patent examiners have 
significant private incentives to grant even invalid patents and little 
incentive to block them. Examiners are also able to devote only a short 
amount of time to examining each patent. Even the procedural rules 
governing patent examinations are stacked against denials. 
Consequently, patent attorneys have come to believe that they can 
push through nearly any patent application with continuous appeals 
 
 18. The costly screen clearly does not create a perfect world where DouglasCo produces 
Baird A only when that production is socially beneficial. The screen will permit all production of 
Baird A, which by assumption will include some instances in which that production will be 
socially costly. We illustrate here only that costly screens can represent Pareto improvements, 
not that they necessarily eliminate all social problems. 
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and re-filings. These improperly granted patents can exact social 
costs, dissuading firms from entering into markets or commercializing 
inventions and clogging the processes of innovation. 
If patent examination is both expensive and ineffective, why 
continue it? In light of these twin failings, scholars have proposed two 
types of systemic reforms. Some advocate investing greater resources 
in more extensive examination by the PTO.19 Others, pointing to the 
large percentage of patents that are economically insignificant, 
suggest scaling back (or even eliminating) the PTO examination 
process and moving toward a system of (free) patent registration and 
ex post review in the courts, much like copyright.20 Both groups, 
however, treat the expenditures involved in prosecuting a patent 
solely as the cost of the active examination that takes place, to be 
minimized wherever possible. 
In this Part, we present a novel conception of the role that the 
PTO process plays in deterring the filing of bad patents. Examination 
procedures at the patent office impose private costs on patent 
applicants. These procedural costs act as a costly screen, dissuading 
putative patent holders from filing for patent rights that they expect 
will be worth little—we call them “low private value” patents. Because 
of the structure of patent rights, these low private value inventions 
will necessarily be harmful, not beneficial, to society at large. That is, 
they will have “low social value” as well.21 Consequently, the PTO’s 
costly screen will block only harmful patents; it will not deter 
innovators from creating genuinely useful inventions. There is thus 
reason to believe that patent-examination costs are useful simply 
because they select against socially harmful patents while leaving 
beneficial ones unscathed. 
A. Patent Costs 
Stories of ridiculous, invalid, and obvious patents have become 
commonplace.22 In recent years the PTO has gained infamy for 
allowing patents on the process of toasting bread, a stick, and a 
 
 19. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 21. Importantly, the converse is not true. A patent with low private value will have low 
social value, but a patent with low social value will not necessarily have low private value. We 
describe and analyze this phenomenon in the Section that follows. See infra Part II.B. This 
Section and the next draw and expand upon Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent 
Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010). 
 22. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 
579 (1999) (describing the expanding scope of patentability). 
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method for swinging on a swing, to name just a few examples.23 Far 
more importantly, however, the PTO has granted invalid patents on 
thousands, if not tens of thousands, of “inventions” in innovative fields 
such as software, biotechnology, and electronics.24 These patents, on 
inventions that either would have been obvious to scientists in the 
field or were anticipated by prior work, carry with them the potential 
to stifle innovation and discourage firms from entering into productive 
markets. Even if they are never litigated—indeed, especially if they 
are never litigated and are never evaluated in court—these “bad” 
patents impose significant costs on consumers and producers in 
precisely those industries in which rapid technological progression 
and the growth of small-scale market participants are most important. 
Patentees will always seek to obtain even invalid patents 
because they can be used to collect licensing fees and block 
competitors. But these types of patents are allowed to come into 
existence only because of the inadequacies and pathologies of the 
procedures employed by the patent office to screen them out. Unlike 
nearly every other federal agency, the patent office treats the private 
parties with whom it interacts—patent applicants—as its 
“customers,”25 and the office describes its mission as “help[ing] our 
customers get patents” and “ensur[ing] strong IP for all Americans.”26 
This is not exactly a skeptical stance. Nor is it mere rhetoric. Rather, 
this view of the PTO’s institutional role manifests itself in the 
procedures that the office has created to process applications and the 
incentives placed upon the key actors within the system, the patent 
examiners. 
 
 23. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 34 (2004) 
(enumerating examples of these worthless and obvious patents). 
 24. See id.  
 25. See, e.g., PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WORKING FOR OUR 
CUSTOMERS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW 1 (1994) [hereinafter PTO, WORKING 
FOR OUR CUSTOMERS], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1994/pg1-5.pdf 
(“We at the PTO remain focused on providing effective and efficient patent and trademark 
service to our customers.”). This is in contrast to other administrative organizations, such as 
prosecutors’ offices, that structure internal cultures and incentives so as to mitigate the effect of 
rational self-interest. Prosecutors themselves have an incentive to dismiss cases or settle them 
quickly, for short sentences, in order to dispose of their workload and maximize leisure time. 
Prosecutors’ offices counter this incentive by creating cultures that value longer sentences and 
higher conviction rates and evaluating line prosecutors on those grounds. See Stephanos Bibas, 
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470–71 (2004) 
(discussing prosecutors’ personal incentives in managing cases). 
 26. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE REVIEW 7 (1997), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1997/; PTO, 
WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS, supra note 25. 
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Each patent application filed with the PTO is referred to a 
single patent examiner, who maintains authority over the application 
during nearly its entire life.27 The examiner must decide whether to 
grant or reject the patent application. Yet these two activities are not 
symmetric. Rejecting a patent application is more difficult and time-
consuming for the examiner than granting one. If the examiner grants 
the application, there is little process required—the examiner simply 
announces that she is allowing the application to mature into a 
patent. If the examiner rejects the patent, however, she must justify 
that decision and identify the relevant prior documents and the 
section of the Patent Act that has caused her to reject the 
application.28 
Patent examiners receive salary bonuses based on the number 
of patent applications that they are able to process.29 This fact, by 
itself, might skew the examiner’s incentives as granting a patent is 
easier than rejecting one. But the problem is in fact far greater. 
 Unlike a patent grant, an examiner’s decision to reject a patent 
application does not end the matter. First, the patent examiner cannot 
issue a “final” rejection on the first go-around.30 If the examiner 
initially rejects the patent, the applicant is entitled to request a 
reexamination in front of the same examiner.31 After this second 
examination, the examiner may choose to issue a “final” rejection of 
the application, though she need not do so.32 (In theory, the examiner 
and the applicant could engage in an infinitely iterated series of 
preliminary rejections and reexaminations, and indeed many patents 
are the subject of three or four office actions before they are finally 
accepted or rejected.33) Yet even if the examiner issues a final rejection 
of an application, the matter is not closed. If the applicant does not 
wish to abandon the invention, she may file a continuation 
 
 27. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 51–53 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the patent prosecution process). 
 28. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2011) (“The reasons for any adverse action or any objection or 
requirement will be stated in an Office action . . . .”). 
 29. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 136 (describing the internal functioning of the PTO). 
 30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113(a). 
 31. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 136 (“But applicants can modify and appeal 
patents that are initially rejected . . . . Thus, a rejected patent will typically consume much more 
of an examiner’s time than one that is allowed after the initial application.”).  
 32. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113(a) (“On the second or any subsequent examination or consideration by 
the examiner the rejection or other action may be made final . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 33. This estimate is based upon conversations with patent prosecutors at a number of law 
firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file with authors. 
1b. Fagundes_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/27/2012  12:52 PM 
2012] COSTLY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 689 
application.34 The patent application remains before the same 
examiner as if the “final rejection” had not been genuinely effective, 
and the examiner does not receive credit toward her bonus. 
Moreover, there is no limit to the number of continuation 
applications that an applicant may file.35 If the applicant is willing to 
pay the necessary costs, the examiner has no way of rejecting the 
application decisively. 
The rational, self-interested examiner thus has a tremendous 
incentive to grant the vast majority of patent applications. By 
consequence, essentially all observers agree that the substantive 
examination of patents at the PTO is of very poor quality.36 The poor 
quality of patent examination is all the more galling in light of its high 
cost. An initial patent application on a relatively complex technology—
a semiconductor or biotechnology patent, for instance—will typically 
cost between $11,000 and $15,000 when prepared by a reputable law 
firm.37 Once PTO fees38 and other attorneys’ costs are figured into the 
 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 120. The applicant can also appeal the decision directly to the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), which can overturn the examiner’s decision and send 
the patent back to the examiner for further consideration. Id. § 134. If the applicant loses before 
the BPAI, she then holds the right to appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit. Id. § 141. The 
applicant may also bring a civil action in federal district court against the director of the patent 
office seeking essentially the same relief, id. § 145, though few choose this route. 
 35. The PTO recently attempted to impose an administrative limit on continuation 
applications, see Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 
Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1), only to see its regulation 
struck down by a district court as inconsistent with the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2. Tafas v. 
Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807, 817 (E.D. Va. 2008). This decision was on appeal to the Federal 
Circuit when the PTO voluntarily agreed to withdraw its new guidelines, mooting the case. See 
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds Controversial Patent 
Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration (Oct. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp. 
 36. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 142; Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance 
at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 n.1 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance] (citing examples of complaints about the PTO’s examinations); Mark A. Lemley et al., 
What To Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005, at 10, 10 [hereinafter Lemley et al., 
Bad Patents] (“[C]ountless patents that seem reasonable to a lay audience overreach in technical 
fields . . . .”); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of 
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007) (discussing “[c]alls for patent reform”); Merges, supra 
note 22, at 589–91 (discussing the poor quality of patents and proposing a revamping of the 
PTO’s examination system); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (“[T]he PTO struggles to improve examination quality.”). 
 37. Oversight Hearing on the United States Patent and Trademark Office Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2008) (statement of Alan J. Kasper, First Vice President, American Intellectual Property 
Law Association), available at http://www.aipla.org/Advocacy%20Shared%20Documents 
/TES_2008-02-27_110C_PTO-Kasper.pdf, at 7. These figures were confirmed in a number of 
independent conversations with attorneys at a variety of law firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis 
LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes are on file with the authors. 
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equation, an average patentee will spend approximately $22,000 to 
successfully prosecute a patent application.39 
In response to the inadequacies of the patent office and the 
costs of obtaining a patent, scholars have advanced a number of 
proposals designed to shore up that failing agency and provide a more 
effective screen against non-novel and potentially harmful patents. 
Some scholars have recommended increasing PTO funding in order to 
enable the office to hire more examiners and spend a greater amount 
of time on each patent.40 Another, smaller cadre has asserted that 
patent examinations should be eliminated altogether, with the patent 
 
 38. The PTO charges a variety of small fees for prosecuting a patent. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 
41(a)(1)(B) (2006) (filing fees); id. § 41(a)(2) (fees for claims); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16(a)(1), 1.16(k), 
1.16(o) (2011) (filing, search, and examination fees); id. §§ 1.16(h), 1.16(i) (2011) (fees for claims); 
id. § 1.16(j) (fees for claims); id. § 1.18(a) (issuance fees). 
 39. This figure is based on calculations undertaken by the authors based on a set of 
representative patents. Notes are on file with the authors and available upon request. In 2001, 
Mark Lemley estimated the average cost at $10,000 to $30,000. Lemley, Rational Ignorance, 
supra note 37, at 1498 (performing back-of-the-envelope calculations of patent costs). If anything, 
then, the estimate here may be overly conservative. 
 40. See generally H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23 (proposing 
that the patent office expend greater funds on more rigorous examination); John R. Allison & 
Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: 
The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2006); Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, 
What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1219 (2004); Lemley et al., Bad Patents, supra note 37, at 12–13. See also Patent Reform 
Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing greater allocations of funds for patent 
examination). Many of these proposals are coupled with suggestions for meaningful inter partes 
post-grant administrative review, mechanisms by which potential infringers can challenge a 
patent’s validity without undertaking expensive litigation in federal courts. See JAFFE & LERNER, 
supra note 23; Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: 
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review 
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 37. 
 Some even recommend a multitiered system of patent review in which applicants can opt for 
one of several levels of PTO scrutiny with correspondingly strong ex post presumptions of 
validity. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23 (proposing an increase in PTO fees as a means 
of funding more extensive patent examination); Lemley et al., Bad Patents, supra note 37 
(proposing the same); Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals for 
Decreasing Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 121 (2005) (proposing the 
same). Other commentators have suggested heightened ex post renewal fees as a means of 
thinning the patent thicket, see, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 877–80, but these increased fees would impact only truly abandoned 
inventions and would have no measurable effect on patents destined for use in nuisance 
lawsuits. And even more exotic proposals abound, including suggestions for tradable patent 
rights that will limit the number of patents in force at any given time by compelling patentees to 
bid on a finite pool of litigation rights. Id. at 890–93. But see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy 
Case for Patent Races Over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2007) (arguing that government is ill-
suited to determine when patent auctions should be held). These proposals for inter partes or 
multitiered review are in many cases quite compelling, and the theory set forth here can serve a 
complementary role to any or all of them. 
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system reverting to a simple system of registration akin to the 
copyright regime.41 
These assessments of the patent system share a common 
feature: they treat the cost of obtaining a patent as simply the 
purchase price for the substantive patent examination. The costs are 
viewed as a necessary evil, worthwhile only to the extent that they 
make substantive examination possible. Hence the view that if costs 
are high and examination is largely ineffectual, the system should be 
reformed.42 Accordingly, most scholars argue that patent costs should 
be no higher than absolutely necessary to facilitate patent 
examination—regardless of whether they believe that there should be 
more or less rigorous examination in the first place.43 None of these 
approaches considers the possibility that the high cost of prosecuting a 
patent might itself have a beneficial effect on the quality of patents 
issued. 
In fact, the cost of obtaining a patent serves an important 
function: it screens out a significant number of harmful intellectual 
property rights—patents that would be filed but for that cost. PTO 
process costs thus create a screen against lower-value patents. If a 
patentee believes that her property right will be worth less than 
$22,000 (or so), she will likely refrain from filing in the first place.44 In 
the Section that follows, we explain the significance of this screen for 
commercial firms, patent filers, and the patent system as a whole. 
 
 41. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of 
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What 
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical 
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007). 
 42. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 43. In addition to the sources cited in notes 40–41, supra, see, e.g., Rochell Dreyfus, 
Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2006) 
(“Indeed, the fee structure should be accomplishing substantive goals: application fees should be 
low enough to attract patenting by all inventors and maintenance fees should be high enough to 
encourage abandonment of noncommercial patents.”). 
 44. It is possible, of course, that patentees will not have good information regarding the 
potential value of their property rights, and that they will file for substantial numbers of patents 
that are worth less than $22,000 or refrain from filing for substantial numbers of patents that 
are worth more than $22,000. We believe this is unlikely. The vast majority of patentees in the 
modern era are major firms doing business in their inventive field. See John R. Allison & Mark 
A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 2099, 2116 (2000) (finding that eighty-five percent of all patents are assigned to 
corporations upon issuance and noting that the average patent lists more than two inventors). 
For these types of actors, estimations of commercial value typically precede research and 
development decisions: firms will only undertake a line of research if they believe (to some 
degree of certainty) that it will be commercially viable. Their knowledge of the marketplace—
necessary to the existence of the business in the first instance—allows them to gauge the 
potential worth of their property rights. 
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B. Low Barriers and Private/Public Asymmetries 
By itself, the fact that patent application processes function as 
a costly screen says little about what sorts of patents will be screened 
out. It also provides little information regarding whether the screen is 
desirable or undesirable. After all, if the costly screen is not 
eliminating harmful patents, it serves only to increase transaction 
costs for patent filers. Yet there is good reason to believe that PTO 
process costs will screen out disproportionately more harmful patents 
and thus produce meaningful benefits. 
Our objective in this Section is to describe and analyze the 
types of patents that will or will not be affected by the PTO’s costly 
screen. In order to do so, we subdivide the universe of possible patents 
into four categories by making two conceptual “cuts.” The first step is 
to determine exactly which sorts of patents the costly screen will select 
against. Accordingly, we divide the universe of patents into “low” and 
“high” value types. We define these categories based on the cost of 
obtaining a patent: those patents that are worth more than $22,000 
are, by definition, “high value” patents, and those that are worth less 
than $22,000 are “low value” patents.45 It is important to note that 
“low” does not necessarily mean “greater than or equal to zero.” Under 
certain circumstances, a patent can have negative value.46 We describe 
these types of patents in the sections that follow.47 
The next step is to determine whether the patents affected by 
the costly screen are “good” or “bad” patents—that is, whether they 
are beneficial or harmful to innovation and to society more generally. 
In order to do this, we draw a conceptual distinction between the 
private value of a patented invention and the public or social value of 
that invention. The private value of a patent is what it is worth to the 
patent holder; the social value is what it is worth to society at large.48 
 
 45. We do not mean to overstate the accuracy of these types of determinations. For purposes 
of the analysis that follows, we describe the operation of the costly screen in terms of orders of 
magnitude: the screen will deter applicants who believe their patents to be worth on the order of 
$22,000 (i.e., in the tens of thousands of dollars) or less and will not dissuade applicants who 
believe they have inventions that are an order of magnitude more valuable (i.e., worth in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars or more). Even this crude distinction permits us to draw 
definitive conclusions about the function and consequences of the PTO’s costly screen. 
 46. We also note that it is not entirely accurate to speak of “low value patents”; the entire 
point of this conceptual division is that the costly screen will deter applicants from filing for 
patents that are worth that little. They are more accurately described as “potential” low value 
patents, but we will refer to them as “low value patents” in the interest of simplicity. 
 47. See infra Parts II.B.2 and 3. 
 48. Two minor points of clarification. First, to be precise, it is the patent itself (the 
intellectual property right) that creates private value by allowing the inventor to capture returns 
from the invention, while it is the underlying invention that creates social value. (However, the 
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Social and private values can be low or high, per the previous 
distinction. 
Using these two distinctions, the universe of patents can be 
separated into four categories. First, there are patents with both high 
private value and high social value. These are valuable, novel 
inventions—new drug compounds, innovative computer circuits, etc.—
that contribute something tangible to society and might not exist but 
for the research incentives created by the patent system. They 
represent the paradigm case for the patent system. Second, there are 
patents with high private value and low or negative social value. 
These are minor or insignificant innovations that contribute little to 
public knowledge but are nonetheless drafted in such a way that they 
can be used to collect significant licensing fees or litigation awards 
from profitable companies.49 Third, there are patents of low private 
value and low or negative social value. These are quite common and 
come in a variety of shapes and forms; we discuss them in greater 
detail below. And fourth, one could imagine patents of low private 
value and high social value. Table 1 illustrates these four potential 
types of patents graphically. 
 
TABLE 1: FOUR POSSIBLE PATENT TYPES 
1. High private 
value/High social 
value 
2. High private 
value/Low social 
value 
4. Low private 
value/High social 
value 
3. Low private 
value/Low social 
value 
 
In the sections that follow, we describe these four categories of 
patents in greater detail and explain their significance in relation to 
the PTO’s costly screen. Our theory is that patents are not evenly 
distributed among these four categories. Instead, there is a 
pronounced asymmetry within the universe of potential patents, one 
 
property right can create social costs.) Nonetheless, in the interest of simplicity we will simply 
refer to low/high private/social value patents. Second, we will describe the social value of a 
patent (its effect on social welfare) directly, not as a sum of some private benefit and some social 
cost. We do this for two reasons. First, the private benefit from patent rights typically involves 
only wealth transfers, which have no effect on social welfare. And second, it is easier to 
understand and evaluate these quantities separately as there is direct information on them. 
These moves have no theoretical consequences; we highlight them only for reasons of clarity. 
 49. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The 
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994). 
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that causes the costly screen to block primarily harmful, low social 
value patents. The PTO’s costly screen may succeed in blocking 
undesirable patents that, if submitted for examination, might slip 
through the cracks of the substantive examination process. 
1. High Private Value/High Social Value Patents 
When one thinks of a paradigmatic patent, one typically 
images a patent that is valuable both to its owners (high private 
value) and to the public at large (high social value). These types of 
patents come in many forms and occupy many technological fields—
they might cover useful new drug compounds, innovative 
semiconductor devices, or the like. But they share three common 
characteristics. First, they must be at least plausibly valid, and thus 
plausibly enforceable as property rights. Second, they must claim 
inventions (or important components or subparts of inventions) that 
are commercially viable and useful in a market economy. Third, the 
patent must describe inventions that are genuinely new and thus 
contribute some socially valuable knowledge that did not previously 
exist. A patent satisfying the first two characteristics is privately 
valuable—its owner will be able to extract rents either through 
licensing or through production of the patented good. To have social 
value—if the invention behind it is to enhance social welfare—the 
third characteristic must also be present. 
The patent system is designed to promote precisely this type of 
high private value/high social value patent. And while the PTO’s 
costly screen will make these patents slightly more costly to obtain, it 
will likely block few or none of them. Twenty-two thousand dollars is a 
meaningful amount of money, but it represents little more than a 
rounding error in comparison to a truly valuable intellectual property 
right. The $22,000 cost of obtaining a patent is unlikely to discourage 
researchers who believe that their work will lead to useful, 
marketable inventions.50 Thus, while the costs of getting a patent are 
 
 50. We hasten to add that under certain circumstances it is possible that small (or solo) 
inventors might be subject to capital constraints that would inhibit their ability to obtain a 
patent or commercialize an invention. Even a valuable idea could be lost if its holder does not 
possess the necessary $22,000 in start-up capital. Nevertheless, it will be the rare inventor who 
cannot obtain the financing necessary to prosecute a patent valued in the millions or (in the 
alternative) find a willing buyer for the same idea. Twenty-two thousand dollars is a fairly small 
amount of money, even for a solo investor. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING 
CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CREATE 
WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY 17–29 (2003) (arguing, using empirical data, that existing 
financial markets provide entrepreneurs with plentiful options for raising capital). It is worth 
noting that $22,000 is far less than the typical mortgage and less even than many unsecured 
personal loans. 
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real, they will not deter any valuable innovations that fall into this 
category. There will be no large losses to society because inventions 
are not being created. 
2. High Private Value/Low Social Value Patents 
Although an ideal patent system would not allow patents that 
generate revenue for their holders without correspondingly benefitting 
society, the current patent system is far from ideal. A patent may have 
contributed little or no useful knowledge, but it might nevertheless 
cover profitable inventions created by others and thus be valuable to 
its owner.51 Patents may be privately valuable because they can be 
deployed offensively, with the intention of collecting awards for 
infringement or licensing fees;52 they may hold value as defensive 
mechanisms for protecting commercial products from competition or 
from suit for infringement;53 and they might be usefully employed as 
signals to dissuade potential market entrants or attract investors and 
other third parties.54 As a class, these patents have high private value: 
they satisfy the first two conditions listed above—plausible validity 
and commercial relevance. 
At the same time, a patent might hold only small or negative 
social value because it involves little or no socially useful innovation. 
These patents do not provide the substantial benefits conveyed by the 
genuinely useful and novel inventions described above. These are the 
types of patents typically wielded by “patent trolls”—those businesses 
that contribute no new useful innovative activity but possess a 
portfolio of patents that they enforce against others.55 
Like the high private value/high social value patents described 
above, the PTO’s costly screen will not serve as a meaningful barrier 
 
 51. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 18–21 (2008) (describing the power of 
invalid patents in collecting rents and interfering with commercialization). 
 52. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 
1522–24 (2005). On licensing, see Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving 
Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1867 (2003). 
 53. See John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent 
Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross 
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 
121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
 54. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 144 (2000); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
625, 651–53 (2002). 
 55. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and 
Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009) (describing and analyzing the behavior 
of patent trolls). 
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to high private value/low social value patents. The $22,000 barrier to 
entry is a small fraction of the value to be realized from a patent of 
this type. Accordingly, the cost of obtaining a patent is almost beside 
the point for inventions such as these. Patent applicants will file for 
them despite the cost. 
3. Low Private Value/Low Social Value Patents 
We now turn to the first class of patents that the PTO’s costly 
screen will select against: those patents that would have both low 
private value (to their owners) and low social value. Here, because the 
private value of any individual patent is less than the cost required to 
obtain it, patent applicants will frequently elect not to file for these 
types of patents. In that sense it is appropriate to think of this 
category as containing “potential” patents—patents that would exist 
in large numbers but for the costly screen. That is not to say that 
there will be no such patents—applicants will sometimes err in 
valuing their own inventions, take gambles, or patent for any number 
of reasons not involving the prospect of financial gain.56 But the 
number of these patents will be much lower than it would be absent 
the PTO’s costly screen. 
What sorts of patents (and potential patents) fall into the low 
private value/low social value category? These patents come in a 
variety of forms, but two important flavors predominate. The first are 
those patents that comprise the “patent thicket”: essentially worthless 
patents that are rarely litigated or enforced. The fact that these 
patents are rarely used does not mean that they have no economic 
significance, however. On the contrary, they drive up search costs and 
increase litigation risk for commercial firms that are actually 
innovating and manufacturing.57 The very existence of these patents is 
enough to raise costs for productive firms, regardless of what the 
patents’ owners do with them.58 
These types of patents raise costs to productive firms in a 
variety of ways. First, any firm that wishes to enter a market must 
investigate the IP that exists in that area of technology and determine 
 
 56. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 15–18) (on file with authors) (cataloging the reasons why 
authors and inventors might produce innovations in the absence of financial motivations).  
 57. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at 615–16; Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 40, 
at 872–74; Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 101, 132–37 (2006). 
 58. Leslie, supra note 57, at 137 (analyzing the harm that even unenforced patents can do 
to competitors and consumers within the marketplace). 
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(at least preliminarily) whether those patents are valid.59 This 
investigation, even if cursory, can be quite expensive. The search costs 
of combing through a technological field littered with patents can be 
prohibitively high for small firms.60 Second, invalid patents can 
hamper a firm’s ability to raise capital61 or write contracts with 
potential customers.62 Financial markets will be wary of firms that 
may be targets for lawsuits because they produce infringing products. 
Customers will hesitate before forming business relationships that 
may expose them to suits for contributory infringement and resist 
relying upon suppliers who may be shut down or driven out of the 
market by a lawsuit.63 Again, these costs will exist even if no lawsuits 
are ever filed. It is the very fact that firms must search through the 
thicket of potentially dangerous patents, and the uncertainty that this 
creates, that drives up business costs. 
The invalid patents that create these costs have very low value 
to their owners—they are valuable only to the extent that their 
owners wish to keep competitors out of the marketplace. Accordingly, 
they diminish social welfare by retarding competition without any 
meaningful inventive quid pro quo. 
The second major flavor of low private value/low social value 
patents—and one that has been comparatively overlooked—is patents 
that are useful primarily in nuisance lawsuits. Any patent 
infringement suit (or threat of suit) involving even a vaguely plausibly 
valid and infringed patent has a nuisance settlement value of 
approximately $10,000. The reason is that any patent defendant who 
is sued must pay for an opinion letter informing the potential infringer 
 
 59. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1344–47 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 40, at 871; Leslie, supra note 57, at 
132–37. 
 60. These search costs are difficult to quantify, and to our knowledge no reliable estimate 
exists. But one can easily imagine that the costs could be quite high, particularly when it comes 
to products that are potentially covered by hundreds or even thousands of patents, such as 
smartphones. See, e.g., Jennifer Collins, Kodak Battles Smartphones over Camera Technology, 
MARKETPLACE (June 22, 2011), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/kodak-battles-
smartphones-over-camera-technology. 
 61. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8 (2003), available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“The threat of being sued for infringement by an incumbent 
[patent holder]—even on a meritless claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital financing.”). 
 62. Leslie, supra note 57, at 125–27. 
 63. See Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit—Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 
634, 641 (1950) (“Contributory infringement . . . can serve as an effective side-attack to cut off 
the economic support of a small producer.”). 
1b. Fagundes_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/27/2012  12:52 PM 
698 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:3:677 
of the strength of the patent holder’s case64 and guarding against later 
claims of willful infringement65—and the cost of such a letter is 
approximately $10,000.66 Substantial numbers of these actions are 
initiated by solo inventors or patent holding companies with no 
commercial ventures beyond the exploitation of its IP portfolio. 
Costs will rise for productive firms if they are forced to pay 
small licensing fees or settlements to a series of patent holders who 
file nuisance lawsuits.67 Firms that face the prospect of being nickel-
and-dimed by the owners of dubious patents may well choose to 
refrain from investing in new technologies or entering new markets in 
the first place.68 In addition, the nuisance lawsuits themselves can 
produce significant deadweight losses; litigants spend thousands of 
dollars in transaction costs to prosecute and settle nuisance lawsuits 
worth $20,000 or less. Accordingly, substantial quantities of even 
plainly invalid patents can impose significant social costs through 
sheer force of numbers. 
The patents that comprise the “thicket” and those that give rise 
to nuisance lawsuits represent intellectual property at its very worst. 
 
 64. This is standard practice within the field. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 
36, at 1513. 
 65. The patent statute allows courts to assess treble damage penalties against willful 
infringers. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed.”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(setting forth the modern standard for determining when infringement has been willful); see, e.g., 
Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining 
that an opinion letter provides near-impenetrable defense to charges of willful infringement); 
Nickson Indus. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the same). An 
accused infringer has no affirmative duty to seek an opinion letter if it wishes to avoid liability 
for willful infringement, Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, but the chances of a finding of willful 
infringement increase dramatically when an infringer has not obtained an opinion letter and so 
nearly any colorable accusation will trigger a request for the opinion of counsel. 
 66. These estimates are based upon conversations with attorneys at a number of law firms, 
principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP (notes on file with author). The cost of 
such a letter can be much higher—in the range of $30,000—if the technology involved is complex 
or the asserted patents are sufficiently numerous. 
 67. Leslie, supra note 57, at 133 (describing the economics of patent nuisance lawsuits). 
 68. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive Intellectual 
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003) (analyzing the prospective effects that 
threats of nuisance lawsuits can have on firm behavior); see also Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 
139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.) (describing a patent as a “scarecrow” that can deter 
competition by its very existence). But see Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 
265 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (“[A] patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage 
competitors from making the patented product or using the patented process, and so will not 
confer monopoly power . . . .”). Judge Posner may be correct that a patent must be of at least 
“colorable” validity in order for it to be used as a means of exerting monopoly power, but see 
Leslie, supra note 57, at 133, but his analysis does not speak to the possibility that the 
asymmetric transaction costs involved in patent litigation will enable the holder of a plainly 
invalid patent to extract small payouts from market entrants. 
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They do little more than drive up transaction costs for firms that 
genuinely want to innovate and bring products to markets. Happily, 
then, the PTO’s costly screen will block these sorts of patents in 
substantial numbers. The upfront costs of obtaining a patent deter 
potential filers from seeking many of these useless patents that would 
otherwise wind up in the thicket. And because it costs more to acquire 
a patent than can be extracted in one or two nuisance settlements, 
patents become substantially less attractive as business tools and less 
open to exploitation.69 
Moreover, the costly screen is even costlier, and thus more 
effective, against these types of patents. There are two reasons for 
this. First, many of the more insidious patents described here hold 
only low private value because they are not plausibly valid.70 All else 
being equal, it is more expensive to force a questionable patent 
through the PTO than a clearly valid one. Patents of suspect validity 
are more likely to be rejected initially by the patent examiner, forcing 
the applicant to pay additional attorneys’ fees and administrative 
expenses in order to resubmit the application.71 Second, the patent 
thicket is most harmful in heavily congested technical fields, where 
large numbers of related patents drive up search costs.72 But the more 
patents that exist within a given field, the more likely that a patent 
examiner considering a new application will find prior art casting 
doubt on whether the invention is novel (and thus patentable).73 In 
 
 69. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 523–24 (1997) 
(analyzing the nuisance lawsuit as a business tactic). This is not to say that nuisance lawsuits 
will never be profitable or that firms will never pursue questionable patents with the intent only 
to extract such settlements. A firm may be able to garner more than one quick payout with each 
patent, though at the same time it will not necessarily be capable of coercing targets—especially 
repeat players—into paying even inexpensive blackmail. Because of the costs of obtaining a 
patent, a firm cannot count on being able to turn a profit, or even recoup its investment, by 
threatening some number of small, meritless suits; it must actually believe that it has an 
invention worth commercializing or a valid patent in a commercially useful field before a patent 
application becomes worth the cost of prosecution. 
 70. Some patents will hold small private value because they are commercially 
insignificant—a patent on a method for swinging on a swing, for instance—but these patents are 
typically irrelevant from an economic or social perspective as well. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra 
note 23, at 32 (describing a variety of commercially irrelevant inventions that have nonetheless 
led to patents). 
 71. See supra Part II.A. 
 72. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (analyzing the negative effects of 
crowded property rights on economic development); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 
(1998) (applying the same idea to innovation). 
 73. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Examiners have better access to patents than they do to 
prior art in any other form. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 145–49 (describing the process of 
patent examination).  
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addition, repeated continuations and re-filings—which become 
necessary if a patent is initially rejected—will delay a patent’s 
issuance, eating into the twenty-year term that begins to run on the 
day a patent application is filed.74 Consequently, transaction costs of 
all types will be higher for inventors who attempt to push through 
questionable patents, or who attempt to patent inventions in heavily 
commercialized fields in which those patents might do the most 
harm.75 
In effect, then, the very administrative processes that allow 
patentees to “wear down” examiners simultaneously increase the 
barriers against the least desirable patents. If the patent system is 
crudely successful at screening for invalid or damaging patents, it is 
not only (or primarily) because examiners are actually denying those 
patents. Rather, the process costs involved in applying for a patent 
may be playing just as large a role. 
Again, of course, the PTO’s costly screen will hardly bar all of 
these low private value/low social value patents; tens of thousands of 
such applications are filed yearly (and many of them are granted 
eventually).76 Yet without a costly screen—if, for instance, the PTO 
were to move to a registration system77—the problem would likely be 
far worse. By selecting against this class of patents, the costly screen 
performs a beneficial function. Indeed, the costly screen may be more 
effective at eliminating harmful low private value/low social value 
patents than the substantive examination that the process costs are 
themselves used to purchase. 
4. Low Private Value/High Social Value Patents 
The previous Section detailed the benefits that the PTO’s costly 
screen provides by weeding out low private value/low social value 
patents. However, these benefits would be quickly outweighed if the 
costly screen were similarly deterring inventors from creating (and 
filing for) low private value/high social value inventions. That is, 
imagine that an inventor has the opportunity to create an invention of 
high social value but would only have the incentive to do so if she 
 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
 75. The semiconductor and computer fields are typically understood to be heavily patented, 
while the pharmaceutical industry is generally thought to involve fewer overlapping property 
rights. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 59–60; Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About 
Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007). 
 76. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 36, at 1528 (providing statistics on the rates 
of patent grants). 
 77. E.g., Kieff, supra note 41, at 59; Mossoff, supra note 41. 
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could obtain a patent on that invention. Imagine further that the 
patent would hold only low private value. If the costly screen 
dissuaded inventors from obtaining patents on these inventions, and if 
the inability to obtain patents dissuaded inventors from innovating in 
the first place, the loss to society might be significant. 
But there is a crucial asymmetry within the universe of 
potential patents: low private value/high social value patents 
essentially do not exist. With very few exceptions, any truly novel, 
commercially relevant invention—that is, any socially productive 
invention—will give rise to a privately valuable patent on that 
invention.78 This is precisely the point of the patent system: patents 
allow inventors to capture a substantial portion of the wealth created 
by their inventions. 
Importantly, then, the PTO’s costly screen will not stand in the 
way of any high social value inventions. Any such invention would 
also hold high private value for its owner, and thus it would be worth 
inventing (and patenting) despite the screen. It is in this sense that 
the asymmetry in patent law, driven by the strength of the patent 
right, makes the PTO’s examination-based costly screen valuable. The 
screen does not deter genuine innovation, but it does block large 
numbers of low private value/low social value patents that create 
social costs for productive and innovative firms. 
Now, to say that the category of low private value/high social 
value patents is empty is to invite counterexamples. But even 
inventions that might appear at first glance to fall into this category 
are not truly low private value/high social value in the sense meant 
here. Or, put another way, the PTO’s costly screen will have no effect 
on whether they will or will not be developed. Consider, for instance, 
“orphan” drugs—pharmaceutical inventions for which patent 
protection has expired (or nearly so).79 Orphan drugs are low private 
value/high social value inventions in the most literal sense: these 
drugs would be valuable to society if manufactured and distributed, 
but no firm can make a great enough profit from them to render their 
development commercially worthwhile.80 As a result, they languish. 
Yet this has nothing to do with the cost of obtaining a patent on the 
drugs. These drugs are unprofitable because the costs of obtaining 
 
 78. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 7–8 (describing the usefulness of patents as legal 
tools for capturing value from innovation). 
 79. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 386–87 (2010) 
(discussing orphaned drugs). 
 80. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 503, 551–55 (2009) (discussing the financial incentives that lead to the problem of orphan 
drugs). 
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Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval are so high—in the 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. In addition, once the FDA has 
approved the drug, any company can manufacture and sell it.81 Other 
firms can then free ride off of the first FDA approval without incurring 
the same costs, competing away the first firm’s profits.82 This is what 
turns drugs into “orphans”; the $22,000 cost of obtaining a patent is 
simply irrelevant to the calculation. 
Or consider the large number of valuable patents that are 
given over to the public for one reason or another. This category 
includes patents on standardized interfaces;83 patents that are 
deliberately pooled and made publicly available;84 and patents that 
have been obtained in the course of a government contract and must 
be licensed at zero cost to the government.85 At first glance, these 
patents might appear to have high social value but low private value. 
After all, their owners are bestowing them freely upon the public. But 
this appearance is misleading. These types of property rights most 
certainly do have high private value; it just happens that the 
particular owners who have come into possession of them have chosen 
to relinquish them, rather than exploit them. This is often because the 
private owner stands to reap greater benefits from renouncing the 
patent than from attempting to enforce it.86 If the patent were owned 
by another firm with a different business model, the outcome would 
undoubtedly be very different.87 Moreover, as we explained above, the 
creation of the intellectual property right is quite beside the point—it 
is the underlying technology that matters to society. Inventors are 
obviously undertaking this research and development even though 
 
 81. Id. at 522. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2009) (describing the problems that can arise when these patents are not 
transferred to the public domain). 
 84. See generally Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law 
and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539 (2007) (discussing the role of patent pools as a tool to enhance 
efficiency and spur innovation). 
 85. See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 229 Cal. Rptr. 828, 834 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he 
government requires defense contractors to give it title or a license in any patents conceived or 
reduced to practice during the course of performance of government contracts.”). We thank Pam 
Samuelson for drawing this category of patents to our attention. 
 86. In the case of the government contractor, for instance, the contractor would 
undoubtedly prefer to retain the patent right. However, the government contract is more 
valuable than the property right—and that government contract is undoubtedly worth more than 
$22,000. 
 87. We return to this point about nonpecuniary motivations in Part III.C.1, infra. 
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they plan to transfer the intellectual property rights to the public.88 
The PTO’s costly screen thus poses no threat to this type of 
innovation. 
Finally, it is possible that patents function as lottery tickets: an 
inventor might file for large numbers of patents, hoping (but not 
knowing) that one will become valuable. Ex ante, each individual 
patent might therefore be worth little to the inventor.89 On this 
theory, the costly screen could conceivably deter the filing of some of 
these lottery tickets. 
We have doubts as to this lottery ticket theory, however. At 
first glance, the theory does not seem to do justice to inventors and 
patent holders, at least on the valuation scales relevant here. As we 
noted earlier, the vast majority of patentees in the modern era are 
major firms doing business in their inventive field.90 Their knowledge 
of the marketplace will likely allow them to make judgments far more 
accurate than the idea of “lottery tickets” would suggest. And again, 
these valuations need not even be terribly fine-grained; the question is 
whether the patent is worth only tens of thousands of dollars or 
substantially more. 
But even if the notion of patents as lottery tickets is an 
accurate representation of reality, it is not clear that the patent 
system should accommodate it. Massive quantities of low value 
patents impose significant negative externalities upon other firms 
seeking to do business in the same markets.91 The PTO’s costly screen 
would force inventors to invest additional resources in acquiring 
information about the expected value of their inventions. This would 
cause them to be more circumspect in selecting which patents to file—
precisely the outcome that would be most beneficial to society.92 
 
 88. Among other things, it is not necessary to obtain a patent in order to ensure that a 
technology remains in the public domain. Proof of first inventorship or dissemination of the 
technology to the public will do the trick. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (g) (2006).  
 89. The idea is related, though not identical, to “patent portfolio theory,” developed by 
Gideon Parchomovsky and Polk Wagner, which embodies the idea that in many industries 
patents are more valuable in groups than they are singly. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk 
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2005). Patent portfolio theory is entirely 
consistent with the ideas we propound here. If a multitude of patents collectively hold some 
significant value, each individual patent may be worth a comparably modest amount. 
 90. Allison & Lemley, supra note 44, at 2117. 
 91. See supra notes 57–77 and accompanying text (describing costs related to low private 
value/low social value patents). 
 92. This will prove impossible only when patent filing must necessarily precede systematic 
investigation of the invention’s commercial worth, most notably (and perhaps only) as with 
patents on new pharmaceutical compounds, which are filed before FDA trials on those drugs 
begin. See generally Roin, supra note 80, at 523–28. There, whatever effect the PTO’s costly 
screen may be having, it is far from debilitating; the pharmaceutical industry is “thought to be 
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The preceding examples should provide some indication as to 
what it means for a patent to have low private value and high social 
value, and why such patents essentially do not exist. In the end, of 
course, there could be minor exceptions to the rule. Inventions may 
fall through the cracks or their value may not become apparent when 
they are created. One could imagine a transformative idea that does 
not directly give rise to an “invention”93 or a peculiar invention that 
creates wealth that somehow cannot be captured commercially. But 
these patents will be the rare outliers. Unlike the other three 
categories of patents, there is no true class of low private value/high 
social value patents. The asymmetry may not be absolute, but it is 
undoubtedly significant. And the theory here does not depend on this 
category of patents being entirely nonexistent; as long as there is a 
meaningful asymmetry, the PTO’s costly screen will 
disproportionately select against patents that are socially harmful. 
 
* * * 
 
Table 2 summarizes this set of relationships between private 
and social value for various types of patents. Only patents of low 
private value and low or negative social value—precisely those patents 
most likely to diminish social welfare—will be meaningfully affected 
by the cost of PTO procedures. Accordingly, the costly screen 
established by patent procedures will act only against low social value 
patents—precisely the type of intellectual property right that the 
patent system should be weeding out. 
  
 
the patent system’s greatest success story.” Id. at 504; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The 
Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720–21 (2005) (“Patent law 
traditionally takes the lion's share of credit for motivating investments in drug development.”). 
 93. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . .”). 
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TABLE 2: SOCIAL AND PRIVATE VALUES OF  
VARIOUS PATENT CLASSES 
 
 High social value Low or negative 
social value 
High 
private 
value 
 
Commercial 
products; 
improvements; 
major components 
Blocking patents; 
valid patents 
involving little novel 
research 
Low 
private 
value 
Essentially none Nuisance patents; 
minor inventions 
 
It remains impossible to know for certain whether the process 
costs involved with patent examination are justified in the aggregate. 
After all, every applicant, including those with valid patents and 
useful inventions, is forced to expend significant resources to obtain a 
patent. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that the costly 
screen imposed by PTO examination, coupled with the substantive 
examination purchased by those costs, serves as a productive filter 
against welfare-diminishing patents without deterring any truly 
socially productive inventions. 
III. COSTLY COPYRIGHTS 
Copyrights, like patents, vest in both highly lucrative and 
popular works as well as in trivial and worthless ones, albeit for very 
different reasons. In contrast to patents, law allows copyrights to arise 
with relative ease. Instead of navigating an extensive examination 
process, authors need only fix their work in a tangible medium in 
order for federal copyright to vest. The costlessness with which 
copyrights arise has led to an unchecked increase in copyrighted 
works of authorship, accompanied by a critical scholarship arguing 
that this increase is socially harmful and that it should be cabined by 
the imposition of various screening devices. Analyzing copyrights 
through the lens of costly screens illustrates why such suggestions 
may diminish, rather than enhance, social welfare. Because copyrights 
array differently across classes of value than patents, imposition of 
costly screens would preclude the production of a crucial category of 
works (low private value/high social value) while eliminating a class of 
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works that is largely innocuous (low private value/low social value) 
and would be detrimental to social welfare. 
A. Copyright Costs 
The vesting of federal copyrights costs authors almost nothing. 
Once an author fixes an original work of authorship in a tangible 
medium of expression, they own the copyright in that work without 
further ado.94 Acquiring a copyright is not entirely costless. Vesting 
requires fixation in a tangible medium of expression, but this is 
usually effectively costless since fixation occurs coterminously with 
creation, as where an author types a novel on a laptop computer or 
paints a portrait on canvas. There are some instances where creation 
may take place in the absence of fixation, such as where the authors of 
sound recordings must record their works to perfect their rights, so 
that, in these cases, fixation will add some cost prior to vesting. Still, 
the costs of fixing a work are, on average, so low that we can treat 
them as negligible for the purpose of our analysis.95 
The essential screenlessness of the federal copyright system 
has caused copyrights to become ever more numerous, and many 
authors have expressed reservations about this trend. A primary 
concern resides in the uncertainty created by the numerosity of 
copyrights. Some have argued that, in a world where any minimally 
original and fixed work is likely the subject of copyright protection, the 
odds that future work will infringe some preexisting right multiplies, 
deterring risk-averse authors from creation.96 In a related vein, others 
have suggested that copyright’s low vesting threshold leads to 
prohibitively high transaction costs because owners are so numerous 
that even if their rights are ascertainable, creators may be unable (for 
 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
 95. Formalities exist in other areas of copyright law. For example, in order to bring a 
copyright infringement suit in federal court, an owner’s work must be registered with the 
Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 411. Registration also secures other advantages for prevailing 
parties, including the option of recovering statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs. Id. 
§ 412. Because registration is not related to the initial vesting of a copyright, and indeed can only 
occur once vesting has taken place, it is not a formality that is relevant to our analysis. 
 96. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 183–207 (2004) (discussing this information 
costs concern about the expansion of copyright); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights 
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2007) (“Intellectual property’s 
road to hell is paved with good intentions. Because liability is difficult to predict and the 
consequences of infringement are dire, risk-averse intellectual property users often seek a license 
when none is needed.”). 
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pecuniary or practical reasons) to acquire the licenses necessary to 
clear the rights associated with making future work.97 
One proposed response to this concern has been to raise the 
process costs associated with copyright in order to limit the number of 
copyrights awarded.98 One such proposal suggests the reintroduction 
of formalities that were formerly prerequisites for copyright vesting. 
Prior to the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976 (“ ‘76 Act”), 
registration with proper notice was necessary for U.S. copyrights to 
arise.99 When the ‘76 Act became effective, the “fixation in a tangible 
medium of expression” standard supplanted the preexisting 
requirements for perfecting copyrights, resulting in a much lower 
vesting threshold. In recent years, writers have floated various 
proposals for increasing vesting costs as a way of liming copyrights. 
Jim Gibson, for example, has called for a straightforward return to a 
pre-1976 Act formalities regime, arguing for the reintroduction of 
notice and publication as copyright vesting prerequisites in order to 
cut down on the accretion of owners’ rights.100 A different but related 
proposal suggested by Larry Lessig, the Public Domain Enhancement 
Act, would require owners to pay $1 to renew their copyrights 
following the fiftieth year of protection.101 Chris Sprigman has also 
suggested a scheme by which compliance with a registration system 
would be a prerequisite to the stronger, property-rule protections of 
 
 97. See, e.g., James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168–
73 (2005) (arguing that the low copyright vesting threshold threatens to restrict creativity, 
particularly in digital settings); Van Houweling, supra note 8 (discussing this transaction costs 
concern about the expansion of copyright); see also, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, 
Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary 
Filmmakers, CENTER FOR SOC. MEDIA 7–22 (2004), available at http://centerforsocialmedia 
.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf (enumerating examples of documentary 
films that have had difficulty being made due to rights-clearance concerns). 
 98. For a good overview of the U.S. experience with formalities, see Jane Ginsburg, The 
U.S. Experience with Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311 (2010). 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (1909 Act). 
 100. E.g., Gibson, supra note 96, at 947–50 (encouraging the reintroduction of traditional 
formalities to limit the expansion of copyright); see also Ginsburg, supra note 98 (advancing a 
qualified defense of formalities in copyright); Stef van Gompel, Formalities in the Digital Era: An 
Obstacle or Opportunity? 3 (proceedings of the ALAI Annual Congress, London, England, June 
14–17, 2009), available at http://www.alai2009.org/Presentations/Van%20Gompel%20Formalities 
%20in%20the%20digital%20era.doc (arguing that reintroduction of formalities will facilitate 
copyright clearance and enhance certainty about owners’ rights in digital media). 
 101. The Public Domain Enhancement Act was proposed in the House of Representatives in 
both 2003 and 2005, but died in committee each time. See H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 
2408, 109th Cong. (2005); see also LESSIG, supra note 96, at 248–56 (discussing early versions of 
the PDEA and the problems it faced gaining traction in Congress). 
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the Copyright Act.102 Though very different, these proposals illustrate 
the push toward increasing process costs among writers concerned 
about excess copyright.103 
In this Part, we raise questions about this literature, at least 
insofar as it suggests that raising the costs of initially acquiring a 
copyright is an unalloyed good. Using costly screen theory, we 
illuminate a typically overlooked reason that the proliferation of 
copyrights may not be as socially harmful as is generally believed. We 
argue that just as costly screen theory helps to explain the logic of 
patent’s costly examination system, so can it help to explain why 
copyright lacks any meaningful hurdles to the creation of authors’ 
exclusive rights. Because the Copyright Act confers on owners a much 
weaker property entitlement than the Patent Act does, copyrights 
array across classes of value differently than patents. This asymmetry 
means that costly screens would be as counterproductive in the 
copyright setting as they would be beneficial in the patent setting. 
That copyrights arise without any process costs creates a 
challenge for analyzing the current system in terms of costly screens. 
With patents, our analytical approach was straightforward. We 
established the costs of patent examination, and used that figure as 
the line dividing high private value patents from low private value 
patents. Thinking about copyright in terms of costly screens, by 
contrast, requires a counterfactual thought experiment. We must 
imagine a cost threshold for copyright vesting, and then examine the 
implication of that threshold on the creation of works of authorship. 
For the sake of symmetry and ease of exposition, we posit a world in 
which getting a copyright is as difficult as getting a patent. In such a 
world, authors would have to submit their work to an expensive and 
onerous examination process, and exclusive rights would not vest until 
after the Copyright Office approved authors’ applications. This 
possible alternative would make copyright vesting just as costly as 
acquiring a valid patent—about $22,000.104 
 
 102. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004) 
(suggesting that registration should be a prerequisite for property-rule enforcement of copyright 
infringement).  
 103. Any such proposal may have implementation problems because the United States’ 
international obligations under the Berne Convention limit its ability to make copyright vesting 
contingent on formalities. Since we mention these proposals only to give a sense of the contours 
of the present copyright literature, we need not address these concerns. 
 104. This is by no means the only possible option. One can imagine a trademark-like system 
for vesting copyright that would involve some consideration of a copyright’s validity and 
compliance with formalities, though far less than patent examination entails. Such a system 
would charge authors the same amount that trademark registrants currently bear, or roughly 
one thousand dollars. Or one can imagine a system that keeps the current copyright registration 
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B. Copyright Screens and Public/Private Asymmetries 
Our next move is to imagine how such a screen would affect the 
production of works of authorship. As with patents, we can imagine 
two axes along which the value of copyright can be arrayed: the 
private value generated for the owner and the social value generated 
for the public. Examples of the private value generated by copyright 
abound. An author’s ability to earn royalties from book or album sales, 
or a movie studio’s capacity to recover revenues from ticket sales to a 
feature film are largely dependent on the owners having exclusive 
rights in those works. Works of authorship are typically nonrivalrous 
and nonexcludable, and, in the absence of legally enforceable exclusive 
rights, owners would have no recourse to uncompensated consumption 
of them. It is thus copyright (the exclusive legal entitlement, as 
distinguished from the protected work) that enables authors to profit 
from their works,105 and in so doing generates private value for those 
authors. The distinction between the author’s copyright in the work 
and the work itself is important. Customers buy books or .mp3s and 
audiences queue up for movies because they want to see the work 
 
regime but makes it a prerequisite to vesting rather than to judicial enforcement of infringement 
actions. This approach would charge authors the current copyright-registration fee, about one 
hundred dollars, to vest their rights. While it may be interesting to examine the implications of 
these systems on copyright vesting, we have opted to use the higher threshold in our thought 
experiment because this Article is about costly screens, and the implications of much lower-cost 
alternatives are simply outside its scope. 
 105. Copyright is not the exclusive means by which authors earn profits from their work. 
Contract may furnish a plausible alternative to copyright in some instances. E.g., William Fisher 
III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1250 (1998) (discussing 
the potential of contract to supplement, and in some cases supplant, copyright as a means for 
enabling authors to extract value from their works). But as the Supreme Court has emphasized, 
copyright remains the dominant means by which authors extract value from their creations. See 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he Framers 
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”).  
 Related, copyright is not always necessary for the production of creative works. Some authors 
may create because they are driven by some other force—desire for literary fame, or simply 
artistic inspiration—that is unrelated to profit. Moreover, some works—such as computer 
programs—may be difficult enough to copy that authors can reap sufficient rewards in the gap 
between first creation and first copy to provide a sufficient incentive to create. See, e.g., Michele 
Boldrin & David K. Levine, Perfectly Competitive Innovation, 55 J. MONETARY ECON. 453 (2008). 
Our thesis thus operates only with respect to works that are produced primarily in response to 
financial incentives. But because these incentives are the core driver of the copyright system, see 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (observing that the “economic philosophy” of the 
Copyright Clause is to “advance public welfare” by “encourag[ing] individual effort” through 
“personal gain”), this limitation does not diminish the force of our argument. 
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itself, regardless of whether it is copyrighted.106 It is thus the work 
that directly generates social value, but the copyright in that work 
that generates private value. 
Social value is harder to quantify in terms of dollars, but, as in 
our patent discussion, we define it simply as the net effect (positive or 
negative) that copyright has on aggregate welfare. As with private 
value, examples of the social benefits generated by creative work are 
familiar. Works of authorship generate aesthetic value, as where a 
landscape painting causes viewers to experience the beauty of the 
scene portrayed by the artist. They may also create informational 
value, as where a cookbook educates users and enables them to make 
new dishes by following specific instructions. A creative work may also 
enrich viewers more generally, as where a groundbreaking fictional 
novel causes readers to think about the world around them, or the 
craft of writing, in a new way. These forms of social value derive 
directly from works of authorship themselves and do not require the 
existence of copyright. Nevertheless, copyright indirectly creates social 
value by incentivizing the creation of socially valuable works, at least 
to the extent that such works may not be created but for the 
protections afforded owners by exclusive rights.107 
Before we consider the impact of costly screens on the 
production of works of authorship, we pause to describe how 
copyrights array across classes of value. As with patents, copyright 
can produce high or low private value, as well as high or low social 
value. Our hypothetical copyright-vesting screen constructs the 
high/low private value barrier. Authors will likely create works that 
will generate more than the cost of the screen ($22,000), but will not 
create any works that generate less than that amount. The idea of 
“low” social value includes possible instances where copyrights create 
negative social value. The social and private value axes combine to 
generate four categories. First are high private value/high social value 
copyrights. These are copyrights that create significant revenue 
streams for their owner while also contributing knowledge, 
information, or entertainment to the public (e.g., popular films, best-
selling novels). The second category describes copyrights with high 
private value and low social value, though we believe that such 
copyrights are vanishingly rare. Third, there are copyrights of low 
 
 106. That consumers are copyright-indifferent is obvious. Countless readers enjoy Moby-Dick 
and John Grisham books every year, even though the latter are copyrighted while the former is 
in the public domain. 
 107. For this reason, we refer throughout this Section to “high (or low) social value 
copyrights,” although the social value is directly generated by the protected work and not by the 
property right that attaches to that work. 
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private value and low social value. We consider at length this category 
and the argument that costly screens are attractive because they 
eliminate such copyrights. Finally, some copyrights generate high 
social value even though they create low private value. We discuss 
this quadrant in detail as well, discussing the social costs associated 
with limiting it. Table 3 illustrates these four potential types of 
copyrights graphically. 
 
TABLE 3: FOUR POSSIBLE COPYRIGHT TYPES 
1. High private 
value/ 
High social value 
2. High private 
value/ 
Low social value 
4. Low private value/ 
High social value 
3. Low private value/ 
Low social value 
 
In the following four subparts, we analyze each of these 
categories of copyrights in more detail. We begin by describing the 
types of copyrights that populate each quadrant. We then consider 
how imposing a costly, patent-like screen would affect the production 
of copyrightable works in each category, and explain how this thought 
experiment reveals that the current, screenless copyright vesting 
system is deceptively socially beneficial. 
1. High Private Value/High Social Value Copyrights 
In the first quadrant lie copyrights that create high value for 
both their owner and for the public. This is the ideal utilitarian 
bargain suggested by copyright’s constitutional source of law108: an 
author creates a work, the public consumes that work, and the owner 
leverages her exclusive rights to earn income from that consumption. 
Copyright’s value equation is often more complicated than this 
account lets on, but frequently matters do unfold in this standard way. 
To take just one example, George Lucas’s popular Star Wars films 
generated enormous private value for their producer, but they also 
enriched the public, either straightforwardly through the aesthetic 
experience of seeing the film, or less directly through the generation of 
cultural touchstones, shared catch-phrases, and timeless motifs. This 
 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
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is not to say that the private and social value created by Star Wars are 
equivalent. Rather, the latter must be greater than the former. While 
George Lucas gets a cut whenever a licensee sells a Star Wars product 
or fans buy a Return of the Jedi DVD, much of the value of the beloved 
sci-fi franchise comes in the form of positive externalities that Lucas 
cannot internalize.109 Moreover, the benefit to an individual from 
seeing the film must be greater than the cost of a ticket. These 
additional benefits above and beyond what members of the public 
must pay constitute social value. 
Here, the case for copyright is least uneasy.110 As we have 
explained above, in the absence of exclusive rights that allow owners 
to internalize value from their works, creators of even very promising 
works would likely not make them at all, depriving themselves—and 
the world—of their value. Copyright is, in other words, a necessary 
prerequisite for the production of high private value/high social value 
works. For this reason, the production of such works would be 
unaffected by high process costs. Twenty-two thousand dollars to 
secure exclusive rights in the Star Wars franchise is laughably trivial 
compared to the billions that Lucasfilm has garnered thanks to those 
rights. Charging this much for a copyright would not deter an author 
who believed that her film, book, or song had the potential for major 
commercial success. 
2. High Private Value/Low Social Value Copyrights 
The second category encompasses copyrights that create 
significant value for their owner, but have low value for the public. 
There are many of these patents, such as blocking patents that allow 
owners to extract substantial value through holdups while creating no 
correlative benefits for society. By contrast, this quadrant contains 
no—or vanishingly few—copyrights. The very different way in which 
copyright law enables owners to extract value from their works of 
authorship makes it unlikely that a work of authorship that generates 
little or no value for the public will lead to a copyright that proves 
remunerative for its owner. 
 
 109. Jon Stewart didn’t have to pay Lucas for making Stewart’s mockery of Dick Cheney 
even more effective by using Darth Vader comparisons, and we don’t have to pay Lucas for the 
humor value of invoking familiar catchphrases in every day conversation (e.g., “These aren’t the 
droids you’re looking for” or “Many Bothans died to bring us this information”). See generally 
Brett Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007) (discussing how 
copyright generates positive externalities). 
 110. Cf. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 283 (1970) (expressing doubt that 
economic incentives actually do increase the production of works of authorship). 
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Two reasons illuminate why this quadrant of the value grid lies 
largely empty. First, the Patent and Copyright Acts create property 
rights of very different scopes. Patent rights are significantly broader 
than the entitlements enjoyed by copyright owners. The Patent Act 
extends to owners exclusive rights preventing anyone else from 
practicing the patentee’s invention or its equivalents.111 It is thus very 
difficult to engineer around a well-drafted patent, and patent holders 
can accordingly reap extensive rewards from commercial products that 
embody the ideas behind their inventions.112 Copyright owners, by 
contrast, do not enjoy this kind of general prerogative to preclude 
others from using their work. Instead, they have only six narrowly 
contoured statutory exclusive rights.113 The scope of copyrights is 
further cabined at the front end by the idea/expression dichotomy. A 
copyright owner exercises rights over only the specific expression that 
is embodied by the author’s work, not to the general ideas that 
animate it.114 It is narrowed again at the back end by various 
statutory defenses, such as fair use115 and § 110’s rabbit warren of 
rights limitations,116 all of which add up to permit unauthorized use 
under many circumstances. The exclusive rights extended by 
copyright simply do not allow authors to internalize anything close to 
the full social value that their work actually generates. As a result, a 
work that creates little social value will have a copyright that almost 
certainly generates little (or no) private value for its author. 
The relative narrowness of copyright owners’ exclusive rights 
points to a second, related reason that the field of high private 
value/low social value copyrights remains unpopulated: copyrights are 
much easier to engineer around than patents. First, consider the 
 
 111. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or 
sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 
(2007) (setting the standard for the patent doctrine of equivalents).  
 112. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at 781–923 (describing patent 
infringement doctrines and explaining their breadth and strength). 
 113. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating six exclusive rights of copyright owners); see 
Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337–38 (2002) (“The copyright 
statute doesn’t give copyright owners the exclusive right to use their works for limited times, or 
the exclusive right to exploit their works commercially for limited times. Instead, it gives 
copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute to the public and publicly 
perform or display their works, subject to a host of statutory exceptions.”) (emphasis added).  
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (excluding ideas from copyright protection). The Patent Act, by 
contrast, allows patentees to prevent others from using the ideas that animate their invention 
for the entire twenty-year exclusive rights period. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
 115. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 116. Id. § 110(5)(B) (permitting public performance of nondramatic musical works by 
transmission or retransmission in commercial establishments meeting certain size and 
technology requirements). 
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idea/expression dichotomy, which limits the subject matter of 
copyright owners’ exclusive rights. Imagine that someone wishes to 
write his own novel about the misadventures of a misfit young 
magician, hoping to capitalize on the popularity of the Harry Potter 
franchise. Such an effort blatantly seeks to free ride off of J.K. 
Rowling’s creativity and success, but, as long as the second book does 
not copy any of the specific protectable expression (e.g., particular 
textual passages, sufficiently well-developed characters) in the Harry 
Potter books, none of Rowling’s rights have been violated.117 Second, 
copyright’s originality requirement creates a safe harbor for authors 
who inadvertently create infringing works.118 The independent 
creation defense allows creators of works identical to preexisting ones 
a full defense if the second author can show that they created their 
work without actually copying the first one.119 By contrast, patent’s 
infringement doctrine allows patentees to enjoin all works that 
practice the invention—even if the purported infringement in no way 
derived from or was influenced by the original.120 
Some critics have suggested that the category of high private 
value/low social value copyrights is more populous than we claim. One 
version of this argument invokes the numerous instances in which 
owners have leveraged their copyright so that future actors were 
deterred from engaging in creative activity (consider, for example, 
owners of sound recordings who insist that hip-hop artists get a 
license in order to sample their works121). That such interactions take 
place is unsurprising; copyright is, after all, the legally enforceable 
 
 117. Rowling might well sue anyway, though, if her reaction to an unauthorized Harry 
Potter lexicon is any indication. There, a federal court concluded that the creation of an 
annotated guide to the Potter series was actionable because it took actual expression from 
Rowling’s books. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 534–38 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). And, for what it’s worth, Rowling herself is the defendant in a suit alleging that she copied 
her Harry Potter character from an earlier book called “Willy the Wizard.” Ryan Kisiel, J.K. 
Rowling Sued for £500 Million in Plagiarism Lawsuit by Family of Late Willy the Wizard 
Author, MAIL ONLINE, June 16, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1193283/JK-
Rowling-sued-500m-plagiarism-lawsuit-family-late-Willy-The-Wizard-author.html.  
 118. That is, an author who originally creates a work of authorship that happens to be 
identical to an earlier one is regarded as not infringing at all. This does not mean that an author 
who appropriates protected work without consciousness of the infringement enjoys any defense. 
The latter remains actionable, and in that sense copyright infringement remains a strict liability 
offense. 
 119. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring that works of authorship be “original” to merit copyright 
protection); see Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 716 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., dissenting 
in part) (noting “the fundamental principle of copyright law that independent creation is never 
infringement”). 
 120. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 121. E.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Get 
a license or do not sample.”). 
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right to preclude others from free riding off the fruits of your creative 
labor. But few of these instances involve an owner leveraging a low 
social value copyright to do so. Popular sound recording catalogs, for 
example, do not involve low social value copyrights at all.122 If 
anything, just the opposite is typically the case. That a musician has 
chosen to sample another’s work proves that the sample has 
significant social value. A sample can be effective only to the extent 
that it is familiar and well known, which means that sampled works 
have almost invariably achieved both commercial success and broad 
popularity—the very definition of a high social value work.123 
Other critics have suggested that copyrights used by their 
owners in an offensive manner fall into the high private value/low 
social value category. Examples include owners of literary estates who 
have enforced copyrights in order to keep famous authors’ personal 
letters private (e.g., J.D. Salinger, Richard Wright),124 as well as 
Scientologists who have brought copyright suits against former 
members to prevent the public release of internal documents relating 
to the governance of their religion.125 The former example does not 
seem to fit within this category at all; the work of renowned novelists 
generates enormous value for society as well as private value for its 
author. One might imagine that Scientologists (or any organization, 
for that matter) might acquire costly copyrights for the sole purpose of 
suppressing critical public dialogue about itself.126 While this use of 
copyright may indeed exact some social costs, such uses are relatively 
rare, and in any event, their impact is limited due to copyright’s 
 
 122. Some writers have compared the music catalog owners’ demands for licenses to that of 
patent trolls, see Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll: The Shady One-Man Corporation 
That’s Destroying Hip-Hop, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2153961/, but this 
comparison is inapt. Companies like Bridgeport Music that acquire catalogues of copyrights do so 
for the same reason any music publisher acquires musical works: to negotiate licenses for works 
in the owner’s catalog, and to protect against unauthorized use of those works. Such companies 
often create value by clearing rights to bodies of work that have become disorganized and 
conflicted. See Bridgeport Music, 383 F.3d at 393–96 (discussing Bridgeport’s work with respect 
to George Clinton’s catalog). 
 123. This does not mean that the strict “license all samples” rule is optimal. It may well be 
the case that society is better served by allowing free use of samples to facilitate second-
generation creation. Our point here, though, is merely a descriptive claim that the copyright in 
the sampled work belongs in the high social value category, not the low social value category. 
 124. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); Salinger v. Random House, 
Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 125. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
 126. Or it may well be the case that Scientologists would continue to produce religious tracts 
even in the absence of exclusive rights, in which case our theory has nothing to say about them 
because they are not responding to the profit motivations that characterize the basic copyright 
bargain. 
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allowing numerous opportunities to engineer around its exclusive 
rights.127 
Ultimately, and most importantly, it is irrelevant to our thesis 
whether or not there are any copyrights in the high private value/low 
social value quadrant because the existence of a costly screen will not 
affect the production of any high private value copyright. For the 
purposes of this discussion, we have defined “high private value” 
works as those generating profits in excess of the cost of the $22,000 
copyright screen. Works that fall into this category (if there are any) 
will, by definition, generate sufficient private value to make it worth 
authors’ time to create them, and will continue to be produced 
regardless of whether they are socially suboptimal.128 Authors will 
create such works, in other words, with or without high vesting costs. 
So while we remain skeptical that there are many—or even any—
works of authorship that generate high private value but low social 
value, that is not an issue that can be affected by the presence or 
absence of costly screens, and thus one that is not addressed by this 
Article. 
3. Low Private Value/Low Social Value Copyrights 
Low private value/low social value copyrights bring value to 
neither their owner nor society. And thanks to the low threshold 
required for copyright vesting, these copyrights are ever more 
numerous. At first glance, this seems to create a problem for our claim 
that increased process costs would be detrimental to social welfare. 
Costly screens cause authors to self-select against the acquisition of 
exclusive rights worth less than a given threshold amount (here, 
$22,000). In Part II, we explained that the appeal of costly screens for 
patents is that they select against this very category. Why, then, 
should we not embrace costly screens in copyright for similar reasons? 
In this Section, we identify three types of purported low private 
value/low social value works that arguably might be eliminated by 
imposing substantial process costs as a barrier to vesting exclusive 
 
 127. These workarounds are discussed in supra Part III.B.3. Some critics have also 
suggested that there are high private value works that have low social value because they are 
truly pernicious—child pornography or snuff films, for example. Even if they do belong in this 
quadrant, such works are typically not created for private profit but from some other, unsavory 
motivation, and their creation would be unaffected by the presence or absence of screens because 
creators of these works do not need exclusive rights to profit from them. 
 128. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s 
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 961–65 (2010) (observing that pornography, even if socially 
pernicious, will tend to be produced independently of whether it is protected by copyright). 
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rights, and we show why none of them actually weigh in favor of that 
approach. 
First, many—perhaps most—copyrights in this quadrant are 
trivial in the sense that they have no social impact whatsoever, good 
or bad. Copyright arises in any work meeting the low originality 
threshold that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, whether 
the author wants exclusive rights or not.129 This is why the third 
quadrant is so populous. An email written to a friend, a home movie of 
a family gathering, or a doodle drawn on the back of a cocktail napkin 
each get the same copyright protection as blockbuster Hollywood 
movies or bestselling mystery novels, despite the fact that the value of 
the former works to their authors or the public is negligible. 
Imposing a costly screen as a vesting requirement would 
certainly eliminate these copyrights. But who cares? Even if it were 
socially beneficial to cut down on these copyrights by imposing a costly 
screen (which would certainly work because, after all, no one is going 
to pay $22,000 to preserve exclusive rights in a drawing on the back of 
a cocktail napkin130), the presence of trivial and inadvertent 
copyrights has no impact on our analysis of the implications of costly 
screens. The reason is simple: these works may not create any social 
value, but neither are they harmful. Rather, they are innocuous 
because they will never be enforced in a socially costly way. In fact, 
the average layperson probably does not know (and certainly does not 
care) that their email or home movie or doodle happens to be 
copyrighted, so these rights, however proliferant, cannot have a 
deterrent effect on future creation. These copyrights could be 
relegated to oblivion by costly screens, but society wouldn’t gain 
anything if they were. 
“Microworks” may also fall into the low private value/low social 
value category. Several scholars have expressed concern that the 
copyright in very small works of authorship, such as the individual 
author contributions that make up the popular online encyclopedia 
Wikipedia, will prohibit future creation because the transaction costs 
(and litigation fears) associated with using such material are 
prohibitively high.131 The concern is that small copyrights may allow 
their owners to engage in socially costly but privately lucrative 
holdouts, which has been a major driver of the anticommons problem 
 
 129. For an interesting narrative illuminating the frequency with which we all create—and 
infringe—copyrights on a regular basis, see John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 
Enforcement and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537. 
 130. Unless the author’s name happens to be Picasso. 
 131. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 8, at 575–76; Van Houweling, supra note 8, at 563. 
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in the patent setting.132 Consider, for example, Wikipedia.133 Every 
sentence in a given Wikipedia entry could be copyrighted by a 
separate author, since the site’s entries are collaboratively written by 
many different people. Reproducing a Wikipedia entry, then, may 
seem to raise all manner of ex ante transaction costs (striking 
licensing deals with numerous owners) or ex post litigation fears 
(deriving from numerous acts of infringement against those owners). 
For those who share this concern, costly screens may seem like an 
ideal way to select against copyrighted microworks and reduce their 
multiplication. 
Upon closer examination, though, we do not believe that costly 
copyrights would generate significant benefits. The reason is that, for 
the most part, microworks do not present a significant risk of welfare-
diminishing holdouts. This is because the numerous limitations on 
owners’ exclusive rights and opportunities for users to work around 
those rights that we discussed earlier134 preclude, or at least starkly 
limit, the kind of holdout concerns that affect patent law.135 
Wikipedia136—a commonly cited example for the potential dangers of 
microworks—illustrates this point. First, the likelihood that the owner 
of a Wikipedia sentence will sue someone for infringement seems 
vanishingly small, both because owners aren’t likely to even know that 
they have a copyright and because people rarely, if ever, contribute to 
Wikipedia for financial reasons.137 Indeed, Encyclopedia Britannica 
never sued individuals for using its materials, and in fact explicitly 
 
 132. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1321 (1996) (discussing holdouts and 
other anticommons-like concerns derived from excess copyright).  
 133. See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 8, at 563–64 (citing Wikipedia as an example of a 
“microwork” that would be socially counterproductive if subject to copyright). 
 134. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing copyright’s various limitations and workarounds). 
 135. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1175, 1175 
n.61 (1999) (“Compared with patent law, copyright law’s tragedy of the anticommons is less 
costly. The ‘fair use’ doctrine means that copyright holders do not have the right to exclude 
nonowners from low-intensity uses of protected works.”). We stress that this does not necessarily 
mean that copyright is a “narrow” ownership interest in some absolute sense but only that 
copyright is significantly, and meaningfully, narrower than patent. 
 136. Van Houweling, supra note 8, at 621–22 (discussing Wikipedia as an example of a 
microwork that may create socially costly holdouts). We should emphasize that we agree with a 
significant proportion of Professor Van Houweling’s excellent article on atomism in intellectual 
property. Indeed, her theory undergirds much of the argument we put forth above regarding 
patents. But on this particular point we do not think that the threat of holdouts from microworks 
is large enough to justify substantially increasing the costs of obtaining a copyright.  
 137. On the contrary, Wikipedia contributors include material largely in order to gain fame 
and/or contribute to a store of knowledge, so they would likely want others to use their material. 
See Andrew George, Avoiding Tragedy in the Wiki-Commons, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 33–34 (2007) 
(discussing the importance of status among peers as a driver of production among Wikipedians). 
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permitted such uses in noncommercial settings.138 But even if it were 
the case that the owner of the copyright in a Wikipedia paragraph 
sued a user for infringement, the defendant would have a host of 
plausible statutory defenses. Fair use would be a promising candidate 
if, as seems likely, the defendant were using the Wikipedia microwork 
in an academic and/or noncommercial setting.139 The defendant would 
also possess many plausible alternatives for workarounds. For 
instance, the idea/expression dichotomy would allow a defendant to 
appropriate as much factual information from Wikipedia as they 
wanted to, so long as they expressed those facts in an original 
manner.140 
A third and final copyright may also fall into the low private 
value/low social value category. Orphan works are those whose 
copyright ownership has become unclear and prohibitively difficult to 
trace.141 Creators who wish to use orphan works find themselves in a 
double bind. They can use the work, raising the possibility that the 
owner will emerge later and demand exorbitant damages or seek a 
crippling injunction. Or they can forego use in light of these litigation 
fears. One of the most familiar examples of orphan works is old 
newsreel footage. The current owners of the rights in decades-old 
newsreels can rarely be ascertained from the newsreels themselves, so 
that documentary filmmakers interested in using the newsreels must 
either engage in a costly search to clear rights to the work, or use the 
footage and face the ongoing risk of costly litigation—all this despite 
that the newsreel almost certainly no longer generates much value for 
 
 138. In fact, Encyclopedia Britannica’s copyright policy explicitly allows for copying of its 
material under many circumstances. See Terms of Use, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA (Aug. 26, 
2011), http://corporate.britannica.com/termsofuse.html (“You may display, reproduce, print or 
download content on the Services only for your personal, non-commercial use. If you are a 
teacher, scholar or student, you may copy reasonable portions of the content for lesson plans, 
interactive whiteboards, reports, dissertations, presentations, school newspapers and for similar 
nonprofit educational purposes to the extent permitted by applicable law.”). 
 139. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (identifying “scholarship” and “research” as illustrative fair uses, 
and indicating that the noncommercial character of a use weighs in favor of fair use). 
 140. One might rejoin that there are some facts or ideas so simple that there is only one way 
that they can be expressed. To the extent that this is the case, copyright law again sides with 
users. The merger doctrine holds that when a fact or idea is capable of only a single expression, 
future users are free to copy that expression, regardless of the owner’s exclusive rights. See, e.g., 
Schoolhouse, Inc. v. Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting the idea that similarity 
in expression cannot be used to show copyright infringement when there is only one way or only 
a few ways of expressing an idea). 
 141. For a good overview of the orphan works issue, including summaries of relevant 
legislative efforts and other government documents, see Orphan Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
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its owner.142 And because few of these copyrights actually earn value 
for their owners, it may initially appear that they fall into the low 
private value/low social value category, so that imposing costly screens 
would have the salubrious effect of eliminating them. 
The orphan works problem, and the specter of related nuisance 
litigation, raises serious concerns, and has spawned pending 
legislation designed to allay the concerns of future creators in order to 
encourage the use of these works.143 It is probably the case that 
orphan works generate only low private value and low social value 
now, but this is irrelevant to our thesis, which concerns only the 
private and social value of copyrights at the time of vesting. At the 
time of their vesting, newsreels likely generated value for their 
creators, who licensed them to be shown before feature films, and for 
society, who relied on them for news and entertainment. That these 
initially valuable works have since migrated across classes of value 
from the first (high private value/high social value) to the third (low 
private value/low social value) quadrant does not relate to our 
investigation into how screens affect the initial decision to acquire a 
copyright. Indeed, if our conjecture that most orphan works were 
initially both socially and privately valuable is correct, then it is likely 
that they would still be created even if the costs of acquiring a 
copyright were raised significantly.144 
4. Low Private Value/High Social Value Copyrights 
The fourth and final category of copyrights contains those that 
generate positive value for the public, but only a little value for their 
owners. With patents, this quadrant did not concern us because it was 
largely empty. By contrast, there are numerous low private value/ 
high social value copyrights, and as a result the dynamics of costly 
screens operate quite differently in this setting. 
It may initially seem counterintuitive that a work could create 
significant value for society while the associated copyright could fail to 
create correlative high value for its owner. This is, as we have shown, 
essentially never the case with patents. But particularly as compared 
 
 142. See LESSIG, supra note 96, at 97–99 (2004) (discussing orphan works as a hurdle to the 
creation of documentary films). 
 143. E.g., Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008). See 
generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 22 (2006), available at http:// 
www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. 
 144. We stress that the concerns we raise about process costs at the outset of copyright 
vesting do not warrant skepticism about formalities that arise after copyright vesting. Indeed, 
such proposals appear to impose process costs in a way that do not raise the specter of deterring 
the creation of socially valuable works, and may well be a good idea. 
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to patent, copyright law’s narrow ownership entitlements allow 
owners to internalize much less of the overall value that their work 
generates.145 This imbalance between the capacity of works of 
authorship to create positive externalities—“spillovers” in Frischmann 
and Lemley’s phrasing146—and the incapacity of copyrights to accrue 
that value for owners means that copyright generates a great deal of 
works whose social value is significant despite earning relatively little 
private value for its author. Indeed, a copyright must generate 
significant social value if the relatively smaller amount of that value 
that owners can internalize is going to provide authors sufficient 
incentive to create. 
In a world animated by our hypothetical costly screen, then, 
when the amount of value authors can extract from a given copyright 
falls below $22,000, authors will typically not create the associated 
work, regardless of whether that outcome is bad for the public.147 
Costly screens would thus suppress production of low private value/ 
high social value copyrights, causing society to bear the losses that 
 
 145. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 146. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 109 (referring to positive externalities created by 
intellectual property generally as “spillovers”). 
 147. We do not mean to discount the possibility that authors will create for reasons 
unrelated to copyright. Some works are created not for profit, but simply because the author 
wants to share an idea with the world (this Article is one of them). See generally YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 2–7 (2006) (discussing nonmarket production of creative 
work). But cf. Lior Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1495–97 (2007) 
(expressing skepticism about Benkler’s enthusiasm for nonmarket production). Other authors 
may create work independently of the existence of copyright because they are incentivized by 
subcultural norms rather than formal exclusive rights. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Chris Sprigman, 
There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the 
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) (showing that stand-up 
comedians create jokes independently of copyright’s incentives).  
 Such authors will continue to create works regardless of costly screens, but because of this—
indeed, because such authors are largely indifferent to copyright—they are not a class of creators 
that is relevant to our thesis. As we explained at the outset, costly screen theory can explain only 
those actors who create copyrights out of a desire for financial reward. And because this 
economic incentivist model is the core premise of the U.S. intellectual property system, our thesis 
retains substantial leverage even in the presence of works motivated by other than pecuniary 
gain. 
 And as the examples we discuss in this Section illustrate, most works in the low private 
value/high social value quadrant are created out of at least some desire for profit. This is 
certainly true of thinly copyrighted works like directories or works that require numerous 
copyrights like news photos; no author makes either of these kinds of works purely from creative 
desire. And while we can imagine that some authors would pen brilliant works even knowing 
they would be commercial failures, most authors write in the hope of earning at least enough to 
make a living. This explains why even now almost all authors of significant literary works seek 
to publish their books for profit, rather than simply making them available for free on the 
internet. 
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result when such works go unproduced. Consider three categories of 
copyrights that would be especially vulnerable to costly screens. 
First are “thinly” copyrighted works, like phone directories, 
information databases, or any useful compilation of facts.148 Copyright 
law already limits the profitability of these fact-intensive works, 
extending to them slender exclusive rights limited only to their 
original selection or arrangement of facts.149 Because creators of data 
compilations already face limited profit margins, costly screens would 
be particularly likely to preclude their production. 
Second, consider creators who require numerous copyrights to 
protect their exclusive rights. A freelance news photographer, for 
example, may take hundreds of pictures in a week, depending on 
exclusive rights in all of them just to make sure that the few that are 
published are used with permission and for a fee.150 Freelance writers 
work on a similar model, and would be loath to shop their work 
around to publishing outlets in the absence of some legal recourse 
against use without permission. In a slightly different vein are 
authors who create a very high number of distinct works on a regular 
basis, such as television news stations, which create numerous 
separate broadcasts daily. In a world requiring a $22,000 threshold for 
copyright vesting, the price of protecting multiple works would 
skyrocket for each of these authors. Less well-capitalized actors, such 
as impecunious freelance writers or photographers, would likely be 
priced out of their profession. And only broadcast news stations that 
were parts of wealthy conglomerates would be able to sustain the costs 
of associated copyrights, driving smaller-scale news outlets out of the 
business. 
Finally, and most saliently, consider the socially valuable work 
that is nevertheless a commercial failure for its copyright owner. 
George Lucas may be the emblematic owner for whom the copyright 
system works ideally, but he is also the exception rather than the 
rule.151 The relationship between the true quality and the commercial 
 
 148. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (2001) 
(discussing thinly copyrighted works). 
 149. E.g., Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991) (holding that 
copyright in factual compilations is limited to originality in selection or arrangement of facts). 
 150. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 98, at 342–43 (discussing the unique difficulties vesting costs 
would impose on authors who depend on the creation of multiple works). 
 151. Even Lucas struggled initially. His first feature film, THX 1138, arguably falls in the 
low private value/high social value quadrant. See THX 1138, LUCASFILM, 
http://www.lucasfilm.com/films/other/thx1138.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (“Stark and 
austere, the striking visual wasteland of Lucas’ faceless future floundered in its initial release at 
the box office but later gained traction among cult audiences and critics.”). Though later 
considered to be a socially valuable film in its own right, THX 1138’s greatest value may have 
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appeal of a work of authorship is weak at best, and this disparity is 
exacerbated by the extent to which copyright’s relatively narrow scope 
limits owners’ abilities to internalize the social value—positive 
externalities—created by their works. One example of the brilliant 
commercial failure is the work whose true value is only understood 
well after its publication. Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick is widely 
considered one of the great American novels, but sold so miserably 
that its author had to abandon writing to seek an income elsewhere.152 
Vincent Van Gogh’s paintings are some of the most original and 
influential in history. Yet no one wanted them during Van Gogh’s 
life,153 although today they are valued at tens of millions of dollars.154 
Many less famous works also generate social value well in excess of 
the private value they accrue for owners. Films may fail at the box 
office, but introduce influential tropes and concepts that are 
unprotected (and therefore unprofitable for owners)155 because they 
amount to unprotectable ideas.156 Academic treatises rarely earn 
significant profits for their authors,157 though they too may generate 
highly socially valuable insights about their subject matters. And 
many nonfamous artists sell paintings for modest prices that could 
well understate the social value in terms of aesthetic pleasure that 
those works generate. 
In our current world, where copyrights vest automatically, 
artists need not negotiate any screens in order to secure rights in their 
works. They thus remain freer to experiment, taking shots with 
innovative works that promise to push the envelope of artistic or 
literary expression, even if the attempt is not that commercially 
successful, perhaps in the hope that their ideas will catch fire and 
make them millionaires. But in a world where securing a copyright 
 
come from its influence on Lucas’s subsequent filmmaking. See The Influence and Imagery of 
Akira Kurosawa, THE SECRET HISTORY OF STAR WARS, http://secrethistoryofstarwars.com/ 
kurosawa1.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (“Annoyed by the rejection and failure of THX 1138, 
Lucas instead turned his attention to the opposite direction: he deliberately set out to make a 
commercial film. With this was born American Graffiti . . . .”). 
 152. ANDREW DELBANCO, MELVILLE: HIS WORLD AND WORK 6–7 (2005). 
 153. In one famous anecdote, a baker said to Van Gogh, “No more bread,” when Van Gogh 
again tried to trade paintings for food.  
 154. See G. Fernandez, The Most Expensive Paintings Ever Sold, THE ARTWOLF.COM ONLINE 
ART MAG., http://www.theartwolf.com/10_expensive.htm (listing the substantial prices paid for 
various Van Gogh works). 
 155. The Marx Brothers’ DUCK SOUP (Paramount Pictures 1933) is now considered their best 
and most highly influential work, but it was a critical and commercial failure at the time of its 
release. See Duck Soup (1933), FILMSITE MOVIE REVIEW, http://www.filmsite.org/duck.html. 
 156. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (ideas are not copyrightable). 
 157. One of us can personally attest to this point. See DAVID FAGUNDES & ROBERT C. LIND, 
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS: COPYRIGHT LAW (LexisNexis 2010).  
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requires a heavy front-end payment of $22,000, the possibility of 
commercial failure will deter many such innovative creators. Realistic 
creators will likely balk at the idea of having to invest additional tens 
of thousands of dollars in work that is not likely to recoup even the 
cost of the screen. And while wildly optimistic authors might be 
inclined to invest in a costly copyright despite their low chances of 
success, they may well lack the funds to do it. Of course, third-party 
companies like publishing houses or movie studios could step in to 
finance costly copyrights, as they finance other costs of creation. But 
in a world where such intermediaries were necessary, the resulting 
creative products would likely be those calculated to maximize the 
intermediaries’ profits rather than to generate positive but not 
internalizable spillover benefits like innovative ideas or novel artistic 
forms. 
Even if copyright owners were required to navigate costly 
screens for their exclusive rights to vest, many copyrights would arise 
and creative work would persist. Lucasfilm would still make Star 
Wars movies despite $22,000 worth of process costs because it will still 
earn scads of cash even though it cannot charge a royalty every time 
someone says, “May the force be with you.” But the indifference of 
wealthy and institutional creators to costly screens should not cause 
us to dismiss the effect of those screens on less well-capitalized 
creators. The less privately remunerative copyrights that costly 
screens would deter do not necessarily create less social value than 
their privately lucrative counterparts. Requiring copyright owners to 
bear the costs of a cumbersome process prior to vesting would inflict 
heavy, though not obvious, costs on the public as well. 
 
* * * 
 
Copyrights array very differently than patents across the four 
classes of value because they are constructed differently, and more 
narrowly, than patents. The first quadrant—high private value/high 
social value—is heavily populated with familiar examples of 
commercially successful works. The second quadrant—high private 
value/low social value—lies empty because copyrights that produce 
only low social value likely cannot allow their authors enough leverage 
to extract meaningful private value. The third quadrant—low private 
value/low social value—is heavily populated, albeit with largely 
innocuous copyrights. The final quadrant—low private value/high 
social value—is crowded as well, with copyrights that are valuable for 
society but that do not allow their authors to extract enough value to 
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clear the price of a costly screen. We summarize these relationships in 
Table 4 below: 
 
TABLE 4: SOCIAL AND PRIVATE VALUES OF  
VARIOUS COPYRIGHT CLASSES 
 
 High social value Low or negative 
social value 
High 
private 
value 
 
Commercially 
valuable, socially 
popular copyrights 
(Star Wars films; 
Harry Potter books) 
Vanishingly few 
Low 
private 
value 
Thin copyrights 
(directories, 
compilations); 
valuable commercial 
failures; iterative 
copyrights  
“Microworks”; trivial 
and inadvertent 
works 
 
As this table illustrates, the second and fourth quadrants of the 
copyright grid are populated inversely to the patent setting. While 
there are many high private value/low social value patents and few 
low private value/high social value patents, just the opposite is the 
case with copyright. As a result, application of costly screens in 
copyright would be counterproductive rather than beneficial. If 
copyright vesting required navigation of a process costing about as 
much as patent examination does, a crucial class of authors would be 
systematically deterred from creating works. Those authors seeking to 
make works that promise enormous social benefits but only paltry 
private ones would simply decline to produce such works, regardless of 
the lost public benefits. Of course, one might point out that these 
social costs might be offset by the other effect of a costly screen: 
selecting against low private value/low social value copyrights. But as 
we have seen, most low private value/low social value works are 
simply innocuous rather than socially harmful, so that the benefits of 
reducing them would be negligible. It is for these reasons, we believe, 
that the copyright system is sensibly devoid of high vesting costs. 
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IV. COSTLY SCREENS IN BROADER CONTEXT 
Refracting copyright and patent through the lens of costly 
screen analysis provides related insights about each of these fields. It 
explains why the dearth of process prior to copyright vesting and the 
burdensome process accompanying patent grants are each more 
beneficial than the current literature suggests. In this Part, we 
observe two points beyond our core insight about the efficiency of the 
present IP vesting system. First, we propose a unified theory of IP 
process that draws on our earlier discussion of costly screens to 
explain why law places such disparate hurdles in the paths of patent 
and copyright owners. Second, we look at other legal contexts whose 
administrative structures (or lack thereof) can be illuminated by the 
efficiency (or inefficiency) of costly screens. 
A. A Unified Theory of IP Process 
Many writers have sought to explain why patents arise only 
after a cumbersome examination process, while copyrights vest 
immediately upon fixation without any process at all. Prior analyses 
have looked to the differential scope of the rights conferred by patent 
and copyright law;158 the divergent social aims of the two fields;159 the 
relative difficulty of evaluating the quality of the subject matter 
protected by patent versus copyright;160 and the incentives created by 
the different degrees of searching required for each of the rights to 
vest.161 Yet despite these numerous attempts, scholars have yet to 
provide a persuasive explanation for the puzzling disparity between 
these two systems.162 
 
 158. E.g., Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983) (arguing that 
because patent is a broader—and potentially more socially costly—right than copyright, there 
should be more barriers to its vesting). We distinguish our theory from Olson’s later in this 
Section. 
 159. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.2.1, at 63–64 (1989) 
(arguing that patent seeks only to encourage efficient production of information, while copyright 
seeks to encourage as much information production as possible, requiring more limits on the 
creation of patents). 
 160. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 469–70, 
487–89 (2004) (arguing that it makes more sense to have barriers to the creation of patents 
because their subject matter is susceptible to objective judgments, while works of authorship are 
relatively more subjective). 
 161. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 146–
47 (1991) (arguing that the barriers associated with patent encourage more searching, causing 
researchers to learn more and refine their work more carefully). 
 162. For an excellent discussion of each of these explanations and how they fail to fully 
explain the differences between the two systems, see Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of 
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1453–56 (2010). 
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The costly screening model we have developed here provides 
the most coherent account of the divergent methods by which patents 
and copyrights are awarded. In contrast to the foregoing theories, 
which seek to explain IP’s vesting disparities in terms of the different 
subject matter governed by each system, we offer a unified theory of 
the administrative processes surrounding intellectual property—a 
theory of “IP process”—centered on the costs of those processes. Our 
theory is based on the relative strengths of the intellectual property 
rights awarded, but not in the most obvious sense. Patents are not 
examined simply because they involve stronger property rights and 
thus could do more damage than copyrights if granted imprudently. 
Copyrights do not arise merely upon fixation in a tangible medium of 
expression only because they are weaker rights that pose little threat 
if they spring into being haphazardly and easily. Such a simplistic 
explanation cannot account for the fact that patent examination is 
highly unreliable—the PTO grants many invalid patents—yet has 
been allowed to persist. If patents (and not copyrights) are examined 
purely because improperly granted patents can cause harm, the 
current system is surely failing. 
The effect of these differences between patents and copyrights 
is, instead, indirect. The strength of the intellectual property right 
defines the various classes of value that each entitlement will create. 
Because patent rights are broad, low private value/high social value 
patents do not exist. A patent would allow an inventor to capture 
much of the benefit from any patent that created significant social 
value. Similarly, because copyrights are narrow, high private 
value/low social value copyrights do not exist—they are too easy to 
engineer around. On the other hand, low private value/high social 
value copyrights are plentiful. 
Accordingly, costly screens embedded within the patent and 
copyright systems will disproportionately select against different 
classes of intellectual property rights by affecting how and whether 
those rights vest in the first instance. In the patent context, there 
exists a good argument for costly screens. Due to the distinctive value 
asymmetries created by the relative strength of patent as a property 
right, screens preclude only the production of inventions that create 
zero or negative social value. Inventions that create high social value 
but generate little value for their owners exist in negligible numbers 
at best, so denying them patents by using costly screens does not 
reduce social welfare. 
But copyright presents a different story. The prevalence of low 
private value/high social value works suggests that imposing screens 
as a precondition to the acquisition of copyright would be 
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counterproductive. The costlier the screen, the more likely it is that 
authors will decline to create works where they are skeptical of 
clearing the value of the screen. In copyright, unlike in patent, 
erecting costly screens as a prerequisite to vesting raises serious 
concerns about precluding the creation of works that are enriching for 
society even though they generate little value for their authors. 
Once the current system of patent examination—as well as a 
hypothetical system of copyright examination or fees—is understood 
as a costly screen, the final piece of this puzzle falls into place. The 
breadth of the patent right creates an asymmetry that the costly 
patent screen exploits in a way that creates social welfare; the 
comparatively narrow copyright creates an asymmetry that would 
interact with a costly screen in ways likely harmful to social welfare. 
The breadth of the intellectual property right defines the appropriate 
shape—and cost—of the process used to bestow it. 
This is, at one level, a descriptive claim: the reason that patent 
and copyright have such different vesting thresholds is that these 
vesting thresholds select differently across the different classes of 
value created by patent (a broader right) and copyright (a weaker 
one). But this descriptive claim is inextricable from our normative 
argument. Our theory of IP process works because patent’s costly 
screens and copyright’s lack of them encourage invention and creation 
at a socially beneficial level. This theory thus implies that the current 
patent and copyright systems are both unfairly maligned, albeit in 
very different ways. The standard account is that patent places too 
many expensive roadblocks in the way of acquiring exclusive rights,163 
while copyright has a problematically low vesting threshold.164 Costly 
screen theory, and in particular, our theory of IP process, 
demonstrates why each of these systems may in fact be much closer to 
optimal than is typically believed. 
We hasten to add that we do not mean to claim that the 
congressional architects of the intellectual property system intended 
or understood this result. The patent examination and copyright 
registration systems most likely arose for other reasons, or through 
 
 163. See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting Kieff’s and Mossoff’s suggestions 
for reform, such as elimination of the patent examination system altogether). 
 164. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 97, at 221–31 (arguing for reintroduction of formalities in 
order to weed out socially negative copyrights); cf., e.g., LESSIG, supra note 96, at 289–91 
(advocating for reforms in the registration, renewal, and marking requirements for copyrights); 
Sprigman, supra note 102, at 517 (suggesting that registration should be a prerequisite for 
property-rule enforcement of copyright infringement). 
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historical accident.165 But it would be odd to imagine that these 
systems could persist through two centuries if they did not lead to 
improvements in societal well-being.166 Our theory of IP process, 
animated by the idea of costly screens, shows that this is likely the 
case. There is a deep relationship between how statutory rights in 
information are constructed and what kind of process is optimal to 
govern the vesting of those rights. 
B. Process Costs and Cognate Fields 
1. Beneficially Costly Law Systems 
Our argument that costly screens are beneficial for the patent 
system rested on the premise that while the examination process is 
substantively ineffective, it still produces value by forcing applicants 
to select against seeking patents that have only low private value. And 
because of patent’s distinctive asymmetry—namely, that there are no 
or vanishingly few patents of low private value that also generate high 
social value—this effect is on-balance positive for social welfare. In 
this Section, we abstract this insight onto the law more generally, 
identifying two cognate fields characterized by high process costs. We 
then show why those processes—typically criticized as excessively 
cumbersome—may be more socially beneficial than is commonly 
thought. 
Begin with due process protections. Many employees may only 
be fired “for good cause” as a matter of either contract or state or 
federal law.167 Employers seeking to discharge employees subject to 
these protections typically must provide the employees with hearings 
 
 165. There is a straightforward historical story to be told about this divergence, of course. 
The modern PTO grew out of the Patent Board established by the Patent Act of 1790. See P.J. 
Frederico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 33, 33–35 
(2003) (describing the formation and original functions of the Patent Board). The lack of 
formalities required for copyrights to vest reflects international norms brought to bear on U.S. 
law by our obligations under the Berne Convention. See International Copyright, UNITED STATES 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl100.html (“There are no formal requirements 
in the Berne Convention.”). Neither of these narratives, however, provides an explanation of why 
patent and copyright processes have developed in such different ways. 
 166. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 614 (5th ed. 1998) 
(explaining the “apparent tendency of the common law to develop efficient rules of conduct” and 
the counterarguments to this proposition). 
 167. See, e.g., 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-7012 (2007) (“Except as is otherwise provided in this 
Division, no deputy sheriff in the County Police Department, no full-time deputy sheriff not 
employed as a county police officer or county corrections officer and no employee in the County 
Department of Corrections shall be removed, demoted or suspended except for cause, upon 
written charges filed with the Board by the Sheriff and a hearing before the Board thereon upon 
not less than 10 days' notice at a place to be designated by the chairman thereof.”). 
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before neutral arbiters and show that good cause for termination 
exists.168 Employers have certain advantages in these hearings, 
particularly repeat-player status and the resources to hire 
attorneys.169 At the same time, they also bear some asymmetric costs: 
they must often create and fund the hearing board,170 and they must 
pay employee wages during hearing pendency (and often cannot 
recover those wages if they are victorious at the hearing).171 Numerous 
critics have suggested that such hearings do little but 
counterproductively raise employers’ costs,172 but this ignores their 
costly screening function. Forcing employers to bear the costs of 
termination hearings causes them to select against terminations that 
are not worth the administrative trouble—a private decision that the 
employer is in the best position to make. Moreover, the asymmetries 
at play in this context mirror those at play in patents. Few 
terminations will generate high social value but only low private value 
for employers (indeed, such an example is hard to imagine). More 
likely, if it is worth an employer’s time and trouble to navigate the 
thicket of a due process hearing, society will also benefit—an employee 
that bad is almost certainly inflicting general social costs as well. 
 
 168. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“The essence of due 
process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Bd. of Regents of 
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (“[W]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, 
or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are essential.”) (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 
(1971)). 
 169. Cf. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 
859, 863–64 (1996) (discussing the disparate interests and incentives of corporate defendants’ 
and plaintiffs’ attorneys); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (asserting that “differences in their 
size, differences in the state of the law, and differences in their resources” distinguish between 
“repeat players” and “one-shotters” in the legal system). In some instances, employees will be 
represented by collective bargaining units who are also repeat players, which may serve to 
mitigate these advantages to some extent. 
 170. See, e.g., 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-7003 (2007) (stating that each Illinois county is 
responsible for paying the salary and expenses of the members of the boards established to 
conduct due process hearings for county employees). 
 171. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (“[T]ermination of aid pending resolution 
of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to 
live while he waits.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Ellis v. Sheahan, 412 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (suggesting 
that the “costs and benefits of alternative remedial mechanisms” should drive the determination 
of the options for recourse made available by an employer to its employees). 
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Consider also housing evictions. Landlords may not exercise 
self-help and summarily lock out tenants who breach their leases.173 
Rather, tenants are entitled to summary eviction proceedings174 that 
tend to advantage and disadvantage landlords for the same reasons as 
termination hearings: landlords enjoy helpful repeat-player status, 
but have to bear costs associated with eviction.175 Many critics have 
argued that this procedure is prohibitively costly for landlords, who 
have to bear most of the costs of the process even though the tenants 
were delinquent,176 as well as tenants, whose involvement in eviction 
proceedings can be located by future landlords, which permanently 
taints their chances of obtaining housing.177 Here too, though, this 
critical scholarship fails to take into account the costly screen function 
of eviction proceedings. The process costs imposed by summary 
evictions function as a helpful information-forcing device, causing 
landlords to limit their evictions only to those tenants whose 
delinquency is so privately costly that it exceeds the costs of eviction 
itself—an assessment that landlords are uniquely well-suited to make. 
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that there will be any evictions that 
generate low benefits to landlords but high benefits to society at large; 
the low private value/high social value quadrant of the grid is 
empty.178 A tenant troublesome enough to make a landlord undergo an 
 
 173. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 408–10 (6th ed. 2006) (describing the growing 
trend among states to prohibit self-help as a permissible remedial measure for landlords and the 
increased availability of summary proceedings as an alternative). 
 174. See generally A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Guay, 923 A.2d 628, 628–30 (Conn. 
2007) (corporate tenant entitled to certain specific processes); Hughes v. Sanders, 847 So. 2d 165, 
167 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (tenants entitled to adequate service of process in addition to summary 
eviction proceedings); Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Melendez, 865 N.E.2d 741, 744–45 (Mass. 2007) 
(summary eviction process used to remove tenant accused of endangering other residents, in 
accordance with lease agreement). 
 175. In California, for example, even where a landlord successfully shows cause for eviction, 
he must remove the tenant’s belongings from the premises and place them in a storage facility—
at his own expense. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1990 (West 2011) (describing the amounts and methods 
for reimbursement of a landlord’s initial posteviction storage expenses). 
 176. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chi., 819 F.2d 732, 736–37 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Posner, J.) (reinforcing the notion that landlords are responsible for most costs associated with 
the rental process by upholding a municipal ordinance allowing tenants to withhold rent 
payments to the extent of a landlord’s failure to comply with the lease terms and allowing a 
credit against rent expenses for repairs a tenant undertakes herself). 
 177. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1679 (2008) (“Evictions via summary proceedings . . . 
necessarily generate public records, and it is those public records that will prove so damaging to 
tenants the next time they try to rent an apartment.”). 
 178. A full analysis of this question is well beyond the scope of this Article, but there is a 
plausible story to be told that eviction valuations function in precisely this way. Any high social 
value eviction—for instance, the eviction of a disruptive tenant who is violent and engaged in 
illegal activity—likely holds high private value as well; the disruption strikes most heavily at 
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eviction proceeding is likely to make life difficult for others as well (by 
making noise or failing to keep up the premises, for example). It is 
entirely possible, then, that the process costs of summary evictions 
generate significant social welfare via their screening function. 
2. Beneficially Costless Law Systems 
Just as our process costs approach to patents explains how 
other complex administrative procedures generate unappreciated 
benefits, our costly screen analysis of copyright illuminates how at 
least one area of law, prior restraints on speech, notable for a striking 
absence of administrative procedure may have an internal logic 
beyond what commentators have typically appreciated. 
The United States has a long tradition of opposition to blocking 
speech before its release to the public, instead preferring to allow 
speakers to interact freely in the belief that an unfettered exchange of 
ideas is the best way to encourage democratic dialogue.179 As a result, 
courts have been particularly skeptical of anything that looks like a 
licensing procedure for speech.180 Licenses for the press (which were 
common in colonial America) are per se illegal,181 and state action that 
even resembles licensure of speech (e.g., licenses for parades, and even 
regulation of vanity license plates) has been invalidated.182 
 
other nearby tenants who are often under the auspices of the same landlord. The paradigmatic 
low private value/low social value eviction might be a tenant who is not disruptive but is 
delinquent on rent; turning such a tenant out onto the street might lead to crime and social 
disruption. This is the category of eviction against which a costly screen will select. The danger 
posed by such a screening mechanism is that tenants will exploit the procedural costs involved 
with eviction by breaching their leases in minor ways, up to the point of making eviction 
worthwhile. Like any transaction cost, then, the costly screen could inhibit efficiency-enhancing 
transactions by enabling unnecessary bad behavior. Nonetheless, this danger may be less 
pronounced in residential housing than in other contexts. Tenants are likely to be highly risk 
averse—the downside risk of miscalculating and being evicted is substantial, and renters are 
often people with little margin to spare—and thus less inclined to push their luck. 
 179. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (roundly rejecting prior restraint). 
 180. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–60 (1965) (invalidating a licensing scheme 
requiring approval from the municipal board as a precondition of permission to license the 
showing of films). 
 181. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (“The presumption against 
prior restraints is heavier—and the degree of protection broader—than that against limits on 
expression imposed by criminal penalties.”). 
 182. E.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 
288 F.3d 610, 626–27 (4th Cir. 2002) (invalidating restrictions on license plates for a heritage 
organization); MacDonald v. Safir, 26 F. Supp. 2d 664, 676–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (invalidating a 
parade permit system as an impermissible prior restraint). 
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There are well-rehearsed constitutional and prudential reasons 
for the per se rule against prior restraints,183 though some writers 
have cast doubt on the latter.184 Here, we seek to advance an 
additional rationale for the rule against prior restraints that is rooted 
in process costs. If courts permitted licensure of speech, the resulting 
administrative apparatus would cause would-be speakers to limit 
speech only to instances where the private value of their speech was 
greater than the cost of a license. In many cases, this would be socially 
costless, where the speech at issue generated only low social value as 
well (it is, after all, easy to ignore annoying or inane speech). But it is 
possible, as with copyright, to imagine numerous instances where 
speech has relatively low private value (because it may not be 
particularly remunerative) but high social value (because the public 
finds it inspiring, or edifying, or beautiful). This is because speech, 
like works of authorship subject to copyright, creates 
disproportionately high positive externalities—such as aesthetic 
enjoyment and intellectual insight—that cannot be recouped by its 
creator. 
Take, for instance, street performers. Sure, most of them are 
terrible, but they can be easily tuned out or walked past, so those that 
create low social value are basically innocuous. Some street 
performers are pretty good, though, and bring value by making city 
streets more colorful and giving passersby a brief moment of aesthetic 
pleasure. Regardless of whether they create low or high social value, 
though, almost all street performers make little enough that a 
licensing requirement would put them out of business.185 
Much the same is true of publicly distributed flyers. While 
most of them deservedly go straight to the trash, some of them may 
 
 183. E.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. 
L. REV. 11, 24 (1981) (arguing that prior restraints are worse than other kinds of speech 
restrictions because they induce self-censorship, expand the scope of government control over 
expression, and delay the dissemination of speech). 
 184. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 549–50 
(1977) (questioning whether prior restraints actually are a uniquely pernicious form of speech 
regulation); cf. CASS SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, 
WHAT CAN BE DONE 9–10 (2009) (questioning the idea that more speech is always better by 
observing that misleading and inflammatory speech can cause mass misperceptions and 
undermine democratic dialogue). 
 185. Popular folk singer Tracy Chapman performed for spare change in Harvard Square 
before she was discovered by her record label, see Stephen Thomas Erlewine, Tracy Chapman, 
ALLMUSIC, http://allmusic.com/artist/tracy-chapman-p3874/biography (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) 
(biography of Chapman); Tracy Chapman, Harvard Square, 1985, ABOUT TRACY CHAPMAN (Apr. 
14, 2006), http://www.about-tracy-chapman.net/tracy-chapman-harvard-square-1985/ 
(photograph of Chapman busking in Harvard Square), but she’s the commercially successful 
exception that proves the rule. 
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articulate important and creative ideas. Our own American Revolution 
was affected to a nontrivial extent by ideas propounded in publicly 
distributed, privately made pamphlets.186 But making flyers for 
indiscriminate public consumption is hardly a highly remunerative 
endeavor, so if such speech were subject to a costly license it would 
likely be stamped out, along with the social value it creates. So as 
each of these examples illustrate, the costs of screening out speech of 
low private value but high social value would overbear any trivial 
advantages of eliminating low private value/low social value speech, 
which suggests that speech licensure exacts net social welfare costs, 
independent of whether it is constitutionally suspect. 
CONCLUSION 
Patents do not come cheaply to applicants. Copyrights, on the 
other hand, arise costlessly, frequently, and even unintentionally. The 
stark contrast between the onerous patent examination process and 
the easy, instantaneous vesting of copyrights seems puzzling. These 
systems have also drawn criticism as causing valueless copyrights to 
proliferate while placing unnecessary burdens on patentees. 
Examining this problem through the prism of costly screen theory 
helps to make sense of the difference between these very different 
systems for vesting property rights in information, and it reveals one 
reason that these much-maligned processes may not be as problematic 
as they are commonly described. 
While navigating the cumbersome patent examination process 
can exact social costs, it also has the advantage of eliminating low 
social value patents (while precluding the creation of no or few high 
social value patents). Copyright’s screenlessness, on the other hand, 
may permit the creation of numerous low social value copyrights, but 
these copyrights are relatively innocuous, and the ease of vesting 
assures the continued creation of high social value copyrights that 
would be eliminated by the imposition of costly process prior to 
vesting. Our analysis points in the direction of a unified theory of IP 
process, one that illuminates the foundational connection between 
how law structures intellectual property rights and how that structure 
necessitates particular processes for granting those rights. 
 
 
 186. An example is Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776), which challenged the authority of 
the British Crown at a crucial time in late colonial America. The text of this pamphlet is 
available at http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/commonsense/text.html. 
